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“I raise up my voice—not so I can shout, but so that those
without a voice can be heard. . . . We cannot succeed when
half of us are held back.”—Malala Yousafzai1
I. INTRODUCTION
The application of criminal sexual conduct statutes to juveniles
and young adults often sparks frustration in the criminal defense bar.
While the litany of state-sanctioned charging flaws is not limited to
those listed here, the following examples give one a sense of why so
many defense attorneys are upset: the unavailability of stays of
adjudication dispositions—which allow a juvenile to avoid
registration as a predatory offender—to extended jurisdiction
juvenile offenders;2 statutory rape charges imposed on eighteen-
year-olds who share a tryst or conceive a child with their fifteen-year-
old high school sweethearts;3 mandatory registration as a predatory
offender for child sexual abuse survivors who perpetrate a sex crime
because they never received therapeutic help from the adults in their
† Angela Bailey and Laura Heinrich are lawyers with the Hennepin County
Public Defender’s Office. Bailey has specialized in criminal, delinquency, and child
protection defense for the last twenty-one years. Heinrich has specialized in criminal
defense and appellate law for the last nine years.
1. Malala Yousafzai, Address at the United Nations Youth Assembly, YOUTUBE
(July 12, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3rNhZu3ttIU [https://perma.c
c/X3XP-7AC3].
2. MINN. STAT. § 260B.198, subdiv. 7(a) (2018). Under section 260B.198,
subdivision 7 of the Minnesota Statutes, a judge may grant a continuance for youths
who plead guilty to an offense. Id. During the continuance, the judge may offer
remedies like probation and rehabilitative services. Id. If the youth complies with
probation, the offense is dismissed. See id. at subdiv. 6. In criminal sexual conduct
cases, this disposition option gives a child an opportunity to avoid the collateral
consequences of a finding of guilt, including registration as a predatory offender.
3. MINN. STAT. § 609.344, subdiv. 1(b) (2018).
2
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lives;4 and—perhaps worst of all—charging sexually exploited youth
with prostitution or related offenses.5 These prosecutions are
typically explained as a necessary evil, either because they are strict
liability offenses or because the charge is a necessary conduit for
desperately-needed rehabilitative services. This view, however, offers
no solace for those facing the resulting devastation that convictions
wreak on their young lives. Loss of employment and housing,
permanent estrangement from families, rejection from society at
large, and relegation to a lifetime of second-class citizenry are
common results of these prosecutions.6
The unjust nature of these results is magnified in juvenile court.
Although juvenile prosecutions are ostensibly governed by the parens
patriae doctrine,7 judges often impose consequences (such as
registration as a predatory offender) that run counter to that
protective policy. In light of this reality, one cannot help but conclude
that skilled advocacy on a case-by-case basis is insufficient to address
this injustice. The real root of the problem is the need for substantive
policy changes.
Ideally, such policy changes would entail a comprehensive
revamping of the criminal sexual conduct code as applied to juveniles,
for the code, as it stands now, has not adjusted to changing social
mores regarding adolescent sexual behavior, nor has it fully
considered collateral consequences or alternative, less destructive
4. Sara Kathryn Lawing, Predictors of Recidivism in Adolescent Offenders, 1404
U. OF NEW ORLEANS THESIS AND DISSERTATIONS 1, 6 (2011) (“One study estimated that
nearly 40–80% of adolescent sex offenders are victims of sexual abuse compared to
estimates of 16% non-sex offenders.”) (internal citations omitted).
5. MINN. STAT. § 609.321, subdiv. 8 (2018) (defining prostitute as “an individual
who engages in prostitution by being hired . . . by another individual to engage in
sexual penetration or sexual contact,” without including any age-based exception or
distinction related to abuse survivors).
6. See David Feige, Shawna: A Life on the Sex Offender Registry, THE MARSHALL
PROJECT (Sept. 17, 2017, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/09/
17/shawna-a-life-on-the-sex-offender-registry [https://perma.cc/RB35-2LEX]
(noting that five years after a guilty plea, an individual was still unable to find a job or
housing).
7. Parens patriae is Latin for “parent of his or her country.” Parens patriae,
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A doctrine by which a government has
standing to prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of a citizen, esp. on behalf of someone who
is under a legal disability to prosecute the suit.”).
3
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means of correcting problematic sexual behaviors. However, such an
effort would take a collective multidisciplinary effort that goes
beyond the capacity of this article. Instead, this article attempts to
address one of the most egregiously unjust areas of juvenile sexual
offender prosecution: the widespread use of child pornography
statutes to prosecute adolescents for sexting.
Minnesota courts and prosecutors must stop applying the child
pornography statute to prosecute sexting between adolescent peers,
particularly those who are sixteen years of age or older because it
violates the purpose of the statute, is unconstitutionally vague, and
violates the equal protection doctrine. Further, sexts between peers
should not be classified automatically as child pornography under a
strict liability analysis, but instead they should be screened to assess
the alleged offender’s actual knowledge of its content and character
as child pornography. Moreover, resulting prosecutions should be
limited to clearly predatory cases.
This article begins by outlining the societal changes in our
country’s teenagers precipitated by technology and changing moral
values, as well as the growing challenge this presents to legal
practitioners. Next, this article dissects Minnesota’s child
pornography statutes and highlights constitutional challenges that
can be made when the statutes are unjustly applied to juveniles who
are not motivated by sexually predatory intent.
II. BACKGROUND
Experts posit that part of the tension in this area of criminal
sexual conduct law as currently applied to adolescent offenders is
balancing the legitimate state interest in protecting society at large
from sexual predators, against the competing goal of protecting
children—with all of their inherent developmental deficiencies—
when they engage in illegal sexual behaviors.8 These juvenile
offenders may engage in behaviors comparable to adults, but they are
8. See, e.g., Anna High, Good, Bad and Wrongful Juvenile Sex: Rethinking the Use
of Statutory Rape Laws Against the Protected Class, 69 ARK. L. REV. 787, 787 (2016)
(considering the “implications of using statutory rape laws against minors to target
‘bad sex’” and contending “that even in relation to ‘bad sex,’ there are serious policy
and constitutional objections to the use of statutory rape laws against a member of
the class they are designed to protect”).
4
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nonetheless vulnerable due to their young age.9 Anna High articulated
this complexity when she stated:
The problem of when and how to use the law to regulate
youthful sexual encounters is both urgent and analytically
complex. Juveniles today are immersed in an online world
that grants unprecedented access to sexual imagery and
discourse. Sexual development is a significant and natural
aspect of the transition to adulthood, but society and the law
rightly recognize that children and teenagers are a relatively
vulnerable and immature population. [Child sex
regulations] respond to this tension with a generalization,
setting an age of consent at which adolescents are deemed
mature enough to make safe and meaningfully consensual
decisions about sex. These laws create a protected class
whose sexual autonomy and privacy interests are restricted
in order to protect them from power imbalances and
harmful decision-making.10
The need to protect children should not be limited to child sexual
assault victims, however. Instead, such protections should also extend
to children and young adults accused of sexual crimes. Children and
young adults are unique and set apart from their adult counterparts
for a reason—a lack of maturity and brain development that impedes
self-control and sound judgment.11 Cases like Roper v. Simmons12
highlight that punishment of children is not about retribution in its
purest sense, but rather correction. For juvenile offenders, there is a
prevailing hope for full rehabilitation because their inherent
developmental deficiencies make them less mature but still receptive
9. Id.
10. Id. at 787–88.
11. See Sarah-Jayne Blakemore & Trevor W. Robbins, Decision-Making in the




BRUV] (suggesting that “that decision-making in adolescence may be particularly
modulated by emotion and social factors, for example, when adolescents are with
peers or in other affective (‘hot’) contexts”).
12. 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005) (holding that imposing the death penalty
against a minor was an unconstitutional violation of the Eighth Amendment).
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to change and improve. 13 Therefore, they are less than fully
responsible for their actions.14 Accordingly, until their brains are fully
developed, which experts posit does not happen until age 25,15 they
should be afforded certain protections not generally available to
competent adults. As Justice Kennedy stated in the majority opinion
of Roper, “[w]hen a juvenile offender commits a heinous crime, the
State can exact forfeiture of some of the most basic liberties, but the
State cannot extinguish his life and his potential to attain a mature
understanding of his own humanity.”16
What should be the response of the criminal justice system in
graphic and explicit sexting cases perpetrated by adolescent
offenders? Diversion with rehabilitative services should be the first
consideration for these youths.17 However, when public safety
warrants a higher degree of care, disposition geared toward
education, discipline, and rehabilitation that facilitates healthy
development to adulthood—with a full opportunity to thrive and
become a productive member of society—should be explored. Despite
the inherently controversial nature of this topic and the difficulties of
regulating something as complex as adolescent sexuality, we cannot
afford to bury our heads in the sand and permit unjust applications of
the law to minors and young adults go unchecked. Instead, Minnesota
needs to change the application of its child pornography statute so
13. See, e.g., Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993) (“A lack of maturity and
an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in
adults and are more understandable among the young.”).
14. Id.
15. See Understanding the Teen Brain, STAN. CHILD. HEALTH,
https://www.stanfordchildrens.org/en/topic/default?id=understanding-the-teen-
brain-1-3051 [https://perma.cc/F6H5-W9Q2] (“The rational part of a teen’s brain
isn’t fully developed and won’t be until he or she is 25 years old or so.”); Sandra
Aamodt, Brain Maturity Extends Well Beyond Teen Years, NPR (Oct. 10, 2011),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=141164708
[https://perma.cc/PBV7-BVZW] (“[E]merging science about brain development
suggests that most people don't reach full maturity until the age 25.”).
16. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 573–74.
17. See generally Robert Fishman, An Evaluation of Criminal Recidivism in Project
Providing Rehabilitation and Diversion Services in New York City, 68 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 283, 284 (1977), https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=6025&context=jclc [https://perma.cc/YN76-J4LD]
(describing attempts of diversion in New York as steering juveniles away from the
traditional justice system towards other forms of rehabilitation).
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that it actually protects children from predators, yet does not
criminalize teenagers for engaging in behaviors that arguably are part
of the natural arc of adolescent sexual behavior. This is especially true
for youth sixteen and older for consensual sexting with peers.
A. Society’s Changing Standards of Sexuality
The need to revamp the law also must include a frank discussion
about changing mores on teenage sexuality. When many of the current
laws were enacted, premarital sex between minors was rare and
socially condemned.18 However, in modern times, teens are
embracing their sexuality and acting on sexual desires in an
unprecedented manner.19 While the state legislature may find it
politically expedient to continue to infantilize sexually mature
teenagers and generalize them as sexually inexperienced, naïve, and
in need of general protection from all aspects of sex, the reality today
is that many adolescents are much more sexually savvy than that
archaic stereotype portrays.20
A substantial subset of sexually mature teens is having sex and
wanting to enjoy it without adult regulation. In 2017, the prevalence
of consensual sexual intercourse among teens nationwide was forty
percent.21 Given that many of these teens attend school with
individuals who are up to four years older than themselves, one can
infer that at least some of these sexual encounters are technically
18. See Joseph J. Fischel, Per Se or Power? Age and Sexual Consent, 22 YALE J. L. &
FEMINISM 279, 286 (2010) (discussing the three waves of statutory rape law
development: 1890s to 1910s, 1970s to 1980s, and the 1990s) (citations omitted);
see generally High, supra note 9, at 791.
19. Adolescent Sexual and Reproductive Health in the United States, GUTTMACHER
INST. (Sept. 2017), https://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/american-teens-sexual-
and-reproductive-health [https://perma.cc/B793-YRY2] (providing a “Fact Sheet”
noting an increase from 2002 to 2006–2010 in first sexual encounters being
described as “wanted” by adolescents); cf. Sheri Madigan & Jeff Temple, 1 in 7 Teens
are “Sexting,” Says New Research, SCI. AM. (Feb. 26, 2018) https://www.scientificame
rican.com/article/1-in-7-teens-are-ldquo-sexting-rdquo-says-new-research/
[https://perma.cc/3HAN-ZYXX] (discussing increased accessibility to smartphones
and the resulting rise in teen sexting).
20. See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 19; cf. Madigan & Temple, supra note 19.
21. Sexual Risk Behaviors: HIV, STD, & Teen Pregnancy Prevention, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (June 14, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/healthyyout
h/sexualbehaviors/ [https://perma.cc/3R5W-Z9KZ].
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violations of governing statutory rape laws designed to discourage
sex with minors.22 This is problematic because many of these couples,
although of differing ages, are peers developmentally. In fact, the
eldest teen could be developmentally delayed in comparison to the
younger sexual partner. Is it then appropriate to prosecute the eldest
teen for engaging in consensual sex with another teen who is their
developmental equal or superior?
B. The Growing Challenge for Legal Practitioners
Most legal practitioners in the defense bar would respond to that
rhetorical question with an emphatic “no,” but they would remain
limited to using case-by-case attacks and strategies to address unjust
applications of sex-crime statutes. For example, an attorney might
make emotional pleas to negotiate the best possible outcome for their
client by securing character references and other evidence of pro-
social behaviors.23 If the assigned prosecutor is not responsive,
defense counsel may appeal to the presiding judge to obtain relief
through trial or substantive motions to dismiss for lack of probable
cause.24 Alternatively, they may have their client engage voluntarily
in rehabilitative services and subsequently file sentencing motions
requesting continuances without a plea,25 as well as stays of
adjudication to keep the client’s record clean. If such tactics fail,
22. See, e.g., High, supra note 8, at 828; Heidi Kitrosser, Meaningful Consent:
Toward A New Generation of Statutory Rape Laws, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 287, 313–16
(1997).
23. See MINN. R. EVID. 405.
24. See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 11.04.
25. See MINN. STAT. § 609.132 (2018) (“The decision to offer or agree to a
continuance of a criminal prosecution is an exercise of prosecutorial discretion
resting solely with the prosecuting attorney.”); MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 14.08 (“The court
may order the agreement terminated, dismiss the juvenile proceedings, and bar
further juvenile proceedings on the offense involved if, upon motion of a party stating
facts supporting the motion and opportunity to be heard, the court finds that the child
has committed no later offenses as specified in the agreement and appears to be
rehabilitated.”); id. at 14.04 subdiv. 2(B) (“The court may order the agreement
terminated and the juvenile proceeding resumed if, upon motion of the prosecuting
attorney stating facts supporting the motion and upon hearing, the court finds that
the child has committed a material violation of the agreement, if the motion is made
not later than one month after the expiration of the period of suspension specified in
the agreement.”).
8
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however, the same attorney can still try to mitigate their client’s
sentence through requests for dispositional and durational
departures from Minnesota guideline sentences.26 However, these
methods are fraught with inherent risks and cannot be successful in
every instance. Although many state prosecutors and judges are
sympathetic to youthful sexual offenders and are, therefore, willing to
work diligently to bring about the least restrictive alternatives to
dispose of these cases, that will not always be the case. 27 Some state
prosecutors and judges strictly adhere to the letter of the law and see
no moral conflict in doing so. The resulting disparity in outcomes
raises the following question: Should the results of each case depend
on such luck-of-the-draw politics as the demeanor of the judge,
prosecutor, or defense attorney that touches the case? Or, if the
endgame is just outcomes for all youths that appear in court, should
there not be consistent guidelines that treat similarly situated youths
similarly?
Juvenile law practitioners face the stark irony of defending
children against laws designed to protect them:
[T]here are serious policy and constitutional problems
with using [child sex] laws against [minors] . . . . First, the
idea that minors can mutually victimize one another is
illogical; statutory rape proceedings against minors for
consensual sex with minors are in fact a punitive response
to sex per se, not victimization. This conflates two discrete
ethical breaches—fornication and exploitation—and risks
both diluting the moral authority of statutory rape laws and
unfairly labeling mere fornicators as sex abusers.
Even in cases involving good-faith attempts to use
statutory rape laws discerningly to target sex involving
victimization of a vulnerable minor by a predatory minor,
selective enforcement of statutory rape laws against the
“true offender” where both minors are legally violators is
predicated on an undefined notion of exploitation. This
gives rise to the potential for discriminatory enforcement
and over-criminalization of adolescent sex, based on
26. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES &
COMMENTARY, 38-48 (Aug. 1, 2018), http://mn.gov/msgc-stat/documents/NewGuide
lines/2018/Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3PC-HJ3F].
27. See High, supra note 8, at 808–10; Kitrosser, supra note 22, at 326–27.
9
Bailey and Heinrich: Stop in the Name of Love: Putting an End to the Felony Prosecutio
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access,
778 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:3
prosecutorial beliefs about the normative boundaries of
good, bad and wrongful sex.28
The status quo today is discriminatory enforcement of child-sex
laws based on a prosecutor’s decision about who may invoke the title
of “victim.”29 Although there is compelling evidence that the entire
criminal sexual code as applied to minors needs to be revamped to
better fit modern social mores and challenges in general, the goal of
this article is to highlight the unjust application of the child
pornography statute on sexting among peers so that adolescents are
no longer prosecuted for consensual sexting activity.
C. Sexting and Child Pornography
Given the alarming trend of state prosecutors using the felony
charge of possession or dissemination of child pornography to
prosecute minors for the widespread practice of “sexting”—a
violation of section 617.247, subdivision 4(a) of the Minnesota
Statutes—something more must be done. Otherwise, an entire
generation of electronics-obsessed children is at risk.
Sexting is generally defined as the practice of taking a nude or
semi-nude sexually explicit picture or video of oneself and sending it
to someone else via phone or other electronic device.30 These images
are generally sent and received consensually, as the parties involved
have unilateral or shared romantic interests or are active sexual
partners.31 Whereas adults engaging in this consensual conduct face
no legal sanctions,32 youth under the age of eighteen who sext
28. High, supra note 8, at 790 (italics in original).
29. See id. at 814–15.
30. See Elana Pearl Ben-Joseph, Sexting: What Parents Need to Know, KIDSHEALTH
(Apr. 2018), https://kidshealth.org/en/parents/2011-sexting.html?ref=search
[https://perma.cc/WXB9-RS63].
31. See THE NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN AND UNPLANNED PREGNANCY, SEX AND
TECH: RESULTS FROM A SURVEY OF TEENS AND YOUNG ADULTS 2 https://www.drvc.org/pdf
/protecting_children/sextech_summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6DJ-UECG] (finding
“71% of teen girls and 67% of teen guys who have sent or posted sexually suggestive
content say they have sent/posted this content to a boyfriend/girlfriend”).
32. MINN. STAT. § 617.247, subdiv. 8 (2018) (creating an affirmative defense if
“the pornographic work was produced using only persons who were 18 years or
older”).
10
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consensually have violated the law.33 These prosecutions are
particularly problematic because they tend to have a disparate impact
on vulnerable subsets of the general adolescent population.
Specifically, studies show that adolescents who are African American,
lesbian, bisexual, gay, or transgender are more likely to engage in
sexting,34 and may, therefore, face a higher risk of prosecution.
Perhaps most alarming about the prosecution of youth sexting is
the possibility of state prosecutors pursuing charges against
individuals who passively received a sext message and, either
purposefully or inadvertently, failed to delete it.35 Those
inadvertently in possession of underage sexts are still subject to
felony prosecutions for possession of child pornography.36 This is
true even if the possession of the explicit message is without malicious
intent, and even if the youth who sent the sext message is a current,
former, or prospective sexual partner who sent the message
voluntarily.37
It is difficult to discern a national consensus as to how
prosecutors are handling these cases in the United States. In fact,
leading research on the topic shows wide variation in how
prosecutors exercise their discretion in handling these cases from
state to state, depending on the range of legislative options and the
policies of different prosecutorial offices.
A study published in January 2013 based on interviews of 378
state prosecutors who had worked on “technology facilitated crimes
33. MINN. STAT. § 617.247, subdiv. 4(a) (2013) (prohibiting possession of
pornographic work involving minors based solely on the possessor’s knowledge of
“its content and character”).
34. Melissa R. Lorang et al., Minors and Sexting: Legal Implications, 44 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY L. 73, 74 (2016) (“A 2012 study of 1,839 youths age 14 to 17 indicated that
15 percent had engaged in sexting. Participants with the highest rates included older
adolescents, African Americans, and lesbian, bisexual, gay or transgender (LBGT)
adolescents.”).
35. Infra Part III(A)(1).
36. Joanna L. Barry, The Child as Victim and Perpetrator: Laws Punishing Juvenile
“Sexting,” 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 129, 144 (2010) (stating that even teachers and
school officials need to be careful in how they investigate and handle confiscated cell
phones containing sexts as to not inadvertently subject themselves to child
pornography charges) (citations omitted).
37. See generally id.
11
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against children” provides some insights.38 Sixty-two percent of
respondents reported having handled “a sexting case involving
juveniles,” with thirty-six percent of the total indicating they had “filed
charges in these cases” on at least one occasion.39 Twenty-one percent
of the total had charged a felony in the past, with “child pornography
production felonies” accounting for eighty-four percent of those
charges.40 Seventeen percent of the prosecutors reported that
charges were brought in some cases in the absence of images showing
“sexually explicit conduct or exhibition of genitals” and sixteen
percent had handled sexting cases that resulted in sentencing to
mandatory sex offender registration.41 A summary of the resolution
of these cases states:
Most prosecutors had sexting cases resolved by plea
agreements (71%) or juvenile court (69%). Half of
prosecutors (50%) mentioned diversion, 26% said
dismissal of charges, and 4% said by a criminal trial. And
16% of prosecutors who had filed charges in these cases had
never had a sexting case that resulted in the defendant being
sentenced to sex offender registration.42
With respect to the decision to pursue legal action, most of the
prosecutors indicated the need for “some type of additional offense,
such as harassment, unruly behavior, or stalking, to file charges and
that the relationship would have had to move beyond the
boyfriend/girlfriend situation.”43 The prosecutors described “four
main themes” that would precipitate charges being filed “against a
minor.”44 The first, “malicious intent/bullying/coercion or
harassment,” could involve distribution of pictures by a current or
former girlfriend or boyfriend who wished to exact revenge or
damage “the other person’s reputation” or, alternatively, distribution
38. Lorang et al., supra note 36, at 74 (citing Wendy Walsh et al., Sexting: When
are State Prosecutors Deciding to Prosecute? The Third National Juvenile Online
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of a photo given voluntarily and under an expectation of privacy that
is used to “bully the juvenile.”45 The second theme involved
distribution of images, either as an invasion of the original sender’s
privacy because consent was not given or an instance where a youth
sends “images of herself to many people” after “there had already
been an intervention.” Third, a large age disparity between the
individuals involved or a sexually-explicit image of a child younger
than twelve years old would trigger charges. Finally, charges would
be warranted if images depicted gang rape or were especially explicit,
graphic, or violent.46
Clearly, it is hard to predict with certainty how prosecutorial
discretion might manifest in any particular case. This variability is
problematic because similarly situated youth might face vastly
different outcomes, with the most severe resulting in collateral
consequences that interfere with future opportunities for growth and
personal development and often amount to a public47 and lifelong
badge of shame. Considering these consequences in light of the habits
of today’s teens, it becomes apparent that the potential liability for
this generation of cyber-addicted youth is staggering and continues to
grow.
To contextualize the magnitude of the potential problem,
consider that according to recent data averaging thirty-nine separate
national studies with 110,380 participants younger than eighteen
years, about twenty-seven percent of teens say they have received
sexually explicit photos, videos, or messages from a peer.48 Moreover,
fifteen percent of the youth surveyed in these studies admitted
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 260B.163, subdiv. 1(c) (2013) (excluding the general
public from and admitting only those the court decides have a direct interest in the
case or the work of the court).




[https://perma.cc/BHC2-PB6M] (citing Sheri Madigan et al., Prevalence of Multiple
Forms of Sexting Behavior Among Youth: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis, AM.
MED. ASS’N E1 (Feb. 26, 2018), https://helt.digital/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/ja
mapediatrics_Madigan_2018_oi_170107.pdf [https://perma.cc/7L98-62TY]).
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sending sexually explicit texts.49 The prevalence of forwarding a sext
without consent and having a sext forwarded without consent were
twelve percent and roughly eight percent, respectively.50
There are several factors motivating today’s teens to engage in
sexting. According to a 2018 article published by KidsHealth, minors
sext because:
Most teens have various ways to get online:
Smartphones, tablets and laptops all can be used in private.
It’s very easy for teens to create and share personal photos
and videos of themselves without their parents knowing
about it.
Girls may sext as a joke, as a way of getting attention, or
because of peer pressure or pressure from guys. Guys
sometimes blame ‘pressure from friends.’ For some though,
it’s almost become normal behavior, a way of flirting,
seeming cool, or becoming popular.
And teens get some backup for that when lewd
celebrity pictures and videos go mainstream. Instead of
ruined careers or humiliation, the consequences are often
greater fame and reality TV shows.51
Girls may also be motivated to sext by the implicit demands of
young boys who grew up with unfettered access to online porn,
coupled with the young girls’ desire to grab the boys’ attention and
spark their sexual interest.52 Adult pornography websites, which
attract millions of visitors every hour with an endless supply of
content, 53 do a poor job of screening visitors to verify user age.
Because kids as young as nine years old have unsupervised internet
access, the numbers of adolescents addicted to pornographic images
49. Madigan et al., supra note 48 (noting that the mean prevalence for sending
and receiving sexts were 14.8% and 27.4%, respectively).
50. Id.
51. Ben-Joseph, supra note 30.
52. See generally Belinda Luscombe, Porn and the Threat to Virility, TIME (Mar.
31, 2016), http://time.com/magazine/us/4277492/april-11th-2016-vol-187-no-
13-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/7CL3-PNZQ] (“Teen girls increasingly report that guys are
expecting them to behave like porn starlets, encumbered by neither body hair nor
sexual needs of their own.”).
53. See id. (noting that “nearly half of the 487 men surveyed . . . had been exposed
to porn before they’d turned 13”).
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is staggering.54 So, what’s a teenage girl to do? Compete for attention
of course, with her own cadre of sexual images and videos on
Snapchat, Instagram, or text.55 And what’s a teenage boy to do?
Respond in kind with graphic images of his sexual parts or, more
commonly, brag and share the images he receives with his friends.56
But once the image falls into the wrong hands, becomes viral, and
the young girl feels the full brunt of the resulting humiliation, a parent
usually contacts law enforcement authorities to regain control over
the situation and put an end to the resulting cyberbullying.57 Schools
and communities where the recipients reside are shaken down,
search warrants are issued, phones are seized, charges are filed, and
young lives are destroyed by criminal charges that sabotage efforts
for employment, housing, and advancement to higher education. 58
Hence, a legal crisis is born. Adults must protect these children from
their own poor judgment.
Aside from the legal analysis of the issue, we, as a society, need to
ask ourselves if labeling young people as sexual predators in these
situations serves the greater good, or simply destroys young lives
over acts of youthful indiscretion. Should adolescents face child
pornography charges and registration as sex offenders for what
amounts to “a 21st century version of ‘I’ll-show-you-mine if you-
54. Id. Since 2005, we have a generation of young people who are so addicted to
porn and masturbation that by the time they are actually ready to form a sexual
partnership with a live person, they may be at risk for erectile dysfunction. See id.
(presenting the debate about whether porn addiction can cause erectile dysfunction).
55. See Kate Sheridan, Sexts are Being Shared Among Teens at Alarming Rates,
NEWSWEEK (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.newsweek.com/sexts-are-being-shared-
among-teens-alarming-rates-822780 [https://perma.cc/QW3L-46UW] (“About one
in seven teens [surveyed] had sent a sext—referring to a text message containing
explicit words, photos or even videos—and one in four had received one.”).
56. See id.
57. See Justin W. Patchin, Joseph A. Schafer & Sameer Hinduja, Cyberbullying and
Sexting: Law Enforcement Perceptions, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. (June 4, 2013),
https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles/cyberbullying-and-sexting-law-
enforcement-perceptions [https://perma.cc/T39M-GFJR].
58. See Sherri Gordon, What are the Consequences of Sexting?, VERYWELLFAMILY
(Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.verywellfamily.com/what-are-the-consequences-of-
sexting-460557 [https://perma.cc/X65F-54DP] (explaining the emotional and legal
consequences of sexting).
15
Bailey and Heinrich: Stop in the Name of Love: Putting an End to the Felony Prosecutio
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access,
784 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:3
show-me-yours?’”59 The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and
National District Attorneys Association have both recognized that
child pornography laws are not meant to address teen sexting.60 The
ACLU of Washington recently highlighted a case out of Spokane
County, Washington to illustrate this point.
In State v. Gray,61 a seventeen-year-old boy sent a sexually
explicit photograph of himself to a twenty-two-year-old woman in a
series of actions constituting sexual harassment.62 The woman
reported the incident to the police, and the boy was convicted as both
the perpetrator and victim of the crime of child pornography.63 The
ACLU of Washington filed an amicus brief with the Washington Court
of Appeals,64 arguing that Washington’s child pornography law was
meant to prevent the sexual exploitation and abuse of minors and not
to criminalize youth for sexual exploration.65 The ACLU further
asserted that a teen taking a selfie, even a nude selfie, did not violate
Washington’s child pornography law.66 Despite the ACLU’s best
efforts, the Washington Court of Appeals and Washington Supreme
Court affirmed the minor’s conviction for distributing child
pornography.67
59. Teen Sexting on the Rise: What This Could Mean For Your Child, TEENSAFE INC.
(Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.teensafe.com/blog/teen-sexting-rise-mean-child/
[https://perma.cc/2ECC-6SDL].
60. See Amy Roe, Teens Who Engage in ‘Sexting’ Should Not Be Prosecuted as Sex
Offenders, ACLU (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-
technology/teens-who-engage-sexting-should-not-be-prosecuted-sex-offenders
[https://perma.cc/42PS-ZJN6] (“Criminal justice officials are beginning to recognize
that child pornography laws are not meant to address teen sexting. The president of
the National District Attorneys Association has publicly urged prosecutors to use
their discretion to avoid criminal charges in many such cases. Courts are also finding
that sexting should not be handled through child pornography prosecutions.”).
61. 402 P.3d 254 (Wash. 2017).
62. Id. at 256.
63. Id.
64. Roe, supra note 60.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Gray, 402 P.3d at 261; State v. E.G., 377 P.3d 272, 278 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016)
(noting that this was “not a case of innocent sharing of sexual images between
teenagers” but a case of sexual harassment).
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These same actions are relatively common among teens today.68
Of teens who have sent nude or semi-nude messages, sixty-six percent
of boys stated they were meant to be “fun or flirtatious,” and forty
percent of girls said they sent sexually explicit messages as a “joke.”69
Prevailing research suggests that none of these same children realized
the risks they were taking by doing so—unwittingly making
themselves vulnerable to felony-level charges. Thus, we must protect
these youth from these unwarranted consequences and find another,
less destructive way to address this important issue.
Unfortunately, the law changes slowly as it takes time for
awareness of the detrimental effects to reach those who have the
platform to bring attention to the issue or the authority to make
changes.70 For that reason, the law typically lags behind current social
mores and does not always fall on the perceived “right” side of moral
justice.71 This has been the case with the long-standing laws that
historically oppressed women, racial minorities, and homosexuals or
other gender non-conforming individuals.72 These archaic laws are
now generally disavowed and regarded as illegal discrimination of
protected classes, but, that was not always the case.73 Perhaps the
68. Roe, supra note 60.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Emma Nelson, St. Paul City Council Passes $15 Minimum Wage, and
Mayor Signs It, STAR TRIB. (Nov. 14, 2018), http://www.startribune.com/st-paul-city-
council-passes-15-minimum-wage/500530412/ [https://perma.cc/5J38-9HVD]
(“The St. Paul City Council . . . approved the citywide $15 minimum wage, which will
be completely phased in by July 2027 . . . Mayor Melvin Carter signed it into law . . .
[t]he unanimous vote was the culmination of about a year of lobbying, protests, public
meetings.”).
71. See generally Nancy Scola, Courts ‘Choose’ to Lag Behind on Tech, Says Chief
Justice Roberts, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
the-switch/wp/2015/01/02/courts-choose-to-lag-behind-on-tech-says-chief-
justice-roberts/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.05bbe0c9a9f3 [https://perma.cc/ZYU8
-HF6X] (“[T]he courts will often choose to be late to the harvest of American
ingenuity.”).
72. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (reversing Virginia’s anti-
miscegenation law on the grounds that it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding
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sexual rights of adolescents will be among the next civil rights issues
of our time.
What can those in the legal community do to be an impetus for
change? Should we be patient and chip away at injustice, one case at a
time? After all, one of the most iconic change agents, Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., famously said that the “arc of the universe is long, but bends
towards justice.”74 Stated another way, the process of reform is long
and fraught with difficulties but in time, change will be widely
embraced as essential to the greater good of all people. As the famous
abolitionist Frederick Douglass once said, “[I]f there is no struggle
there is no progress. . . . Power concedes nothing without a demand. It
never did and it never will.”75 Hence, all of us have a moral duty to
demand justice by resisting injustice wherever it is found.
Strategically, in making this demand for justice, a case-by-case
protest is not as effective as dismantling a systemic problem at its
root.76 This is especially true in the context of sex crimes where the
consequences are often immediate, severe, and carry a devastating
social stigma that the accused often bears for a lifetime.77 Although
74. See Melissa Block & Clayborne Carson, Theodore Parker And The ‘Moral
Universe’, NPR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (Sept. 2, 2010), https://www.npr.org/templat
es/story/story.php?storyId=129609461 [https://perma.cc/BY69-TDYC] (reading
the 1853 sermon by Theodore Parker that “Dr. King then used and made it his own”
and playing the audio of Dr. King during the march from Selma in 1965 using Parker’s
quote).
75. See Allison Keyes, Frederick Douglass’ 200th Birthday Invites Remembrance
and Reflection, SMITHSONIAN (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smit
hsonian-institution/frederick-douglass-200th-birthday-invites-remembrance-and-
reflection-180968100/ [https://perma.cc/UHS6-EGAV] (quoting FREDERICK DOUGLASS,
TWO SPEECHES BY FREDERICK DOUGLASS 22 (1857) (generally known as the “West India
Emancipation Address” delivered at Canandaigua, N.Y. (Aug. 4, 1857)),
http://www.libraryweb.org/~digitized/books/Two_Speeches_by_Frederick_Dougla
ss.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZUV-EJMT]).
76. See generally John Hollway, Calvin Lee & Sean Smoot, Root Cause Analysis: A
Tool to Promote Officer Safety and Reduce Officer Involved Shootings Over Time, 62 VILL.
L. REV. 883 (2017), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/7459-hollway--villanova-
rca-for-policing [https://perma.cc/Z2VT-72R2] (defining root cause analysis as “a
method of problem solving designed to identify core underlying factors, including
environmental or systemic factors, that contributed (along with individual decision-
making) to generate an undesirable outcome, organizational accident, or adverse
event”).
77. See Feige, supra note 6.
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one hopes that the safeguards of prosecutorial discretion and good
old-fashioned common sense might inspire some restraint from the
State in charging these cases, that approach leaves much to chance.
Unfortunately, the youth that are charged are at the mercy of their
attorney’s fortitude, and the disposition of the assigned prosecutor or
presiding judge, who may or may not see the injustice of the charge or
its potentially devastating collateral consequences. However,
consistent legal challenges to the constitutionality of the law might
force an appeal that leads to a published legal decision that would
dismantle this problem as applied to all, or at least large groups, of
adolescents who are detrimentally affected. This could also force the
legislature to take a closer look at a law that is inadvertently
destroying young lives, rather than protecting them.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
It is incumbent upon defense attorneys in Minnesota to
vigorously litigate the validity of the State’s application of the child
pornography statute to sexting youth, in order to highlight the
injustice of that phenomena and hopefully end the practice for good.
To launch an effective attack on the statute, one must explore both the
letter of the law and its underlying legislative intent.
Section 617.247 of the Minnesota Statutes intends to “protect
minors from the physical and psychological damage” that results from
being depicted sexually in pornographic work by punishing those in
possession of those types of pornographic works.78
Section 617.246, subdivision 1 defines key terms such as “minor,”
“pornographic work,” and “sexual conduct.”79 “Minor” is defined as
anyone “under the age of 18.”80 “Sexual conduct” includes a range of
behavior from any act of “sexual intercourse” that includes genital
contact with the genitals, anus, oral cavity, or an animal.81 “Sexual
conduct” also includes acts of sadomasochistic abuse, masturbation,
“lewd exhibition” of genitals, or “physical contact” with bare or
covered areas of another person’s “buttocks” or “breasts” that
78. MINN. STAT. § 617.247, subdiv. 1 (2013).
79. MINN. STAT. § 617.246, subdiv. 1 (2013).
80. Id. subdiv. 1(b).
81. Id. subdiv. 1(e)(1).
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simulates sex or that is done for sexual gratification.”82 “Pornographic
work” is listed as a variety of visual mediums depicting “sexual
performance” that involves a minor, any visual depiction that “uses a
minor” for “actual or simulated” sexual content, any content that is
modified or changed to make it appear as though an “identifiable
minor” is engaged in “sexual conduct” or that is conveyed in a way that
would lead a person to believe the “visual depiction” includes a minor
engaging in sexual conduct.83
Subdivision 2 of the same statute makes the conduct of using a
minor in sexual performance or pornographic work a felony level
offense.84 Specifically, it states that it is illegal for someone to use or
assist others in the creation of visual images that depict “any sexual
performance” or “pornographic work” that includes minors, including
any situation where the person “knows or has reason to know” that
the “conduct” could be used for those purposes.85 The subdivision
explains that the person in violation of this law can be sentenced for
“no more than ten years” or be required to pay no more than $20,000
in fines for a first offense or $40,000 for subsequent offenses.86
The teen subject’s voluntary participation in and dissemination
of pornographic work does not change the possibility of criminal
prosecution.87 Specifically, subdivision 5 of section 617.246 states,
“Neither consent to sexual performance by a minor or the minor’s
parent, guardian, or custodian nor mistake as to the minor's age is a
defense to a charge of violation of this section.”88 This absence of
consent as a defense is inherently problematic because sexting
between peers logically does not invoke an image of lecherous and
predatory intent toward young children. In fact, a study from Drexel
University found that “[sixty-one percent] of teens had no idea that
sharing their own nude photos is a felony that can result in criminal
prosecution” and placement on the sex offender registry.89 “Sixty
82. Id. subdiv. 1(e)(2–5).
83. Id. subdiv. 1(f).
84. Id. subdiv. 2.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. subdiv. 5.
88. Id.
89. Soraya Chemaly, 12 Reasons Why Gender Matters to Understanding Teenage
Sexting, HUFFPOST: LIFE (Dec. 6, 2017, 2:42PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/12-
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percent of teens said that knowing [the potential criminal liability]
would probably be a deterrent.”90
Although any party who sends or possesses the video or picture
are chargeable, prosecutors typically focus on the recipient of the
explicit image rather than the sender, usually a female teen, who sent
the explicit image in the first place.91 Thus, in practice due to the
reality of prosecutorial discretion favoring female alleged victims who
are often the first or more vocal party initiating a complaint, these
prohibitory laws disproportionately impact male adolescents.92
Arguably, this sexist application of the sexting criminal statutes has its
roots in the 1960s feminist movement where notable leaders like
Andrea Dworkin successfully characterized all pornography as
degrading to women and a medium that perpetuates violence against
and subordination of women generally in our society.93 However,
Minnesota law, at least in theory, holds both the sender and the
recipient, regardless of their gender, liable for owning, disseminating,
and receiving pornographic work.94 The sender and recipient can
each be fined up to $10,000 and charged with a felony.95
Digital and virtual relationships are more popular now than ever,
including “adolescent romantic and sexual relationships of all kinds—
happy, tragic, mutual, one-sided, healthy, [and] abusive.”96 Sexting




91. Pamela Paul, He Sexts, She Sexts More, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/17/fashion/women-are-more-likely-to-sext-
than-men-study-says-studied.html [https://perma.cc/HE8C-ZQ8R] (noting one
survey that suggests “[w]omen are more likely to ‘sext’ than men.”).
92. Chemaly, supra note 89.
93. ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1979) (arguing that
pornographic publications and films dehumanize and abuse women by encouraging
men to eroticize their subjugation and therefore are training guides for committing
sexual violence).
94. MINN. STAT. § 617.247, subdiv. 3–4 (2013).
95. Id.
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every teenager grows up owning a cellphone.97 According to
Professor Elizabeth Englander of Bridgewater State University and
the Massachusetts Aggression Reduction Center, “[S]exting reflects
adolescent curiosity about nudity and bodies and is an activity for
‘kids who are sort of interested in sexuality but might not be ready for
actual sex.’”98
A 2018 study of over 110,000 teens from around the world found
that “[o]ne in seven teens report that that they are sending sexts, and
one in four are receiving sexts.” 99 Perhaps even more alarming is that
“one in nine teenagers report forwarding sexts without consent.”100
Unfortunately, many children are unaware that sending or receiving
a sexually suggestive text or image to another minor under the age of
eighteen is considered possessing or disseminating child
pornography and can result in felony-level criminal charges.101 While
many states have enacted non-felony laws such as a gross
misdemeanor provision outlawing the nonconsensual dissemination
of private sexual images, including Minnesota,102 and even more are
considering legislation,103 Minnesota prosecutors have the discretion
to determine whether to use the new, often less serious legal
provisions, or to charge the child with a felony.104 Thus, children
97. Id. (“The average age of first cellphone ownership is 10.3.”).
98. Id. (quoting Elizabeth Englander & Meghan McCoy, Sexting–Prevalence, Age,
Sex, and Outcomes, JAMA PEDIATRICS (Apr. 2018), https://jamanetwork.com/journals
/jamapediatrics/article-abstract/2673715?widget=personalizedcontent&previousa
rticle=2673714&redirect=true [https://perma.cc/ET3T-UD9Y]).
99. Madigan & Temple, supra note 19.
100. Klass, supra note 96.
101. Madigan & Temple, supra note 19.
102. See MINN. STAT. § 617.261, subdiv. 1, 2 (2019) (allowing the gross
misdemeanor prosecution of anyone who disseminates “an image of another person
who is depicted in a sexual act or whose intimate parts are exposed in whole or in
part,” unless aggravating factors are present, which enhance the penalty to a felony).
103. Brandon De Hoyos, Sexting Laws in the United States, LIFEWIRE (Sept. 2, 2018),
https://www.lifewire.com/sexting-laws-in-united-states-1949957
[https://perma.cc/EZH9-9M9D].
104. Rayeed Ibtesam, On Teenage ‘Sexting’ and the Law, 37 HAMLINE J. OF PUB. L. &
POL’Y 246, 263 (2017) (“[M]ost instances of teenage sexting are handled based on
prosecutorial discretion. Also many of the sexting statutes that are in congress
waiting to be enacted also give a lot of discretion to prosecutors and thus provide
ample opportunity for abuse.”).
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engaged in the exact same behavior may face vastly different
outcomes, depending on how that discretion is exercised.
A. Using the Penumbra Doctrine to Protect Teens
Although this article posits that the law should protect all
adolescents from criminal prosecution for sexting, this argument is
strongest for children involved in sexting who are sixteen and older.
This subset of teenagers should be set apart from other youth for two
primary reasons. First, at sixteen, any felony delinquency charge they
face is public information.105 They are not afforded the same data
105. Historically, records on juvenile offenders maintained by the juvenile court
are not available to the general public and are available to other government agencies
only on a “need to know” basis, unless the juvenile court orders otherwise. This
privacy policy is based on the primarily rehabilitative mission of the juvenile justice
system and the expectation that the system will best achieve its objectives if the
juvenile and his or her mistakes are protected from public scrutiny. However, this
general rule has significantly changed in the past 20 years in Minnesota and other
states. As a result, juvenile records, particularly those involving serious crimes
committed by older juveniles, currently are available to a variety of specified entities
and individuals. MINN. STAT. § 260B.171, subdivs. 1, 4 (2018). Often, the openness of
the record depends on the juvenile court category into which the juvenile has been
placed.
 For example, if a juvenile offender is at least 14 years old and
commits a felony-level crime, he or she may be certified to stand
trial as an adult in criminal court. If this occurs, all of the records
relating to that crime are handled in the same manner as criminal
records of adult offenders and are, generally speaking, public.
 Additionally, if a juvenile is 16 years old or older and is accused
of a felony-level offense, all proceedings conducted by the
juvenile court relating to that offense are open to the public, and
all records relating to it are, likewise, available to the public.
 The victim of a juvenile’s offense has the right to be informed of
the final disposition in the case, the right to attend the juvenile
court hearing at which the juvenile receives the disposition, and
the right to object to or otherwise comment on the disposition.
 Finally, if the juvenile justice system decides to place a felony-
level juvenile offender in the hybrid “extended jurisdiction
juvenile” (EJJ) category* and the offender is under 16 years old,
the proceedings and records are not open to the public, but the
records will become publicly available if the offender’s juvenile
disposition is later revoked and his or her adult sentence is
imposed.
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privacy protections in juvenile court as other minor children, so the
stakes are much higher for them in terms of public stigma from having
a public record and collateral consequences such a public record
would likely cause, impeding opportunities for higher education,
employment, and housing. Second, under Minnesota law, children can
legally consent to sex when they are sixteen years old.106 Accordingly,
it is more imperative to initiate legal challenges to protect this subset
of children and, given their age, those legal challenges could be made
using classic constitutional civil rights law focused on sexual privacy
and equal protection jurisprudence.
Employing constitutional jurisprudence to dismantle overly
intrusive areas of the law is a tradition that dates back to the founding
fathers. The belief that all citizens are endowed with certain “God-
given” and, therefore, inalienable “natural rights” that should not be
subject to government interference is a mainstay of constitutional
jurisprudence.107 In fact, this “natural law” philosophy was the
inspiration for both the state and Federal Bill of Rights.108 For
example, the United States Supreme Court has pointed out that “the
Ninth Amendment provides: ‘The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people.’”109
Minn. Stat. §§ 260B.171, subdiv. 4; 611A.037, subdiv. 2; 611A.038.
*A juvenile in this category is adjudicated in juvenile court and, upon
conviction, receives both a juvenile court disposition and an adult
sentence. If the juvenile fails to abide by the terms of the juvenile
disposition, it may be revoked and the adult sentence may be imposed
immediately, often resulting in incarceration in adult prison.”
See Access to Government Data Maintained on Juvenile Offenders, MINN. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES RES. DEP’T (2004), https://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/ju
vdata.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DTB-8PPF].
106. MINN. STAT. § 609.344, subdiv. 1(e–g) (allowing consensual sex with a minor
at least sixteen years old, where the actor is more than 48 months older and does not
hold a position of authority over the complaint, or the actor does not have some other
significant relationship).
107. Charles S. Desmond, Natural Law and the American Constitution, 22 FORDHAM
L. REV. 235, 235-36 (1953), https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?artic
le=1424&context=flr [https://perma.cc/83FQ-LPPQ].
108. Id.
109. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
24
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The legal challenges that could be launched to protect this subset
of children is not limited to federal constitutional law. In fact, arguably
these children are afforded more rights under Minnesota’s state
constitution. Specifically, Article I, section 16 of the Minnesota
Constitution explicitly states that, “[t]he enumeration of rights in this
constitution shall not deny or impair others retained by and inherent
in the people.”110 In the case of State v. Hershberger, the Minnesota
Supreme Court interpreted this provision to mean that the State could
not infringe upon nor interfere “with religious freedom.”111 Thus, the
State of Minnesota afforded greater protections to its citizens than did
the Federal Constitution.112 This liberal interpretation of the state
constitution is also applied to the Minnesota Due Process Clause.
During the late nineteenth century, the due process clause of the
Minnesota Constitution was drafted to protect substantive rights—
such interests that were not explicitly listed in the constitution.113 If
the legislature drafted a criminal statute, the statute must survive the
scrutiny of the Due Process Clauses of both of the Federal and
Minnesota Constitutions or risk being overturned.114
This “natural rights” notion expanded into a body of case law
where the courts substituted their own judgment for that of the often
stodgy and out-of-touch legislators who were not in the trenches of
litigation, in touch with changing social mores, nor privy to the
specific facts of cases that rendered the law outdated and unjust.115
110. MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 16.
111. 462 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1990).
112. Id.
113. State v. Moseng, 254 Minn. 263, 268–69, 95 N.W.2d 6, 11–12 (1959) (“[A]
criminal statute must be definite as to persons within the scope of the statute and acts
which are penalized, and if the criminal statute is not definite, the due process clauses
of [the Minnesota Constitution], and of [the United States Constitution], whichever
may be applicable, are violated.”).
114. Id.
115. Steven G. Calabresi & Sofia M. Vickery, On Liberty and the Fourteenth
Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees, 93
TEX. L. REV. 1299, 1327 (2015), http://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/20
15/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf [https://perma.cc/YM3H-L3B8] (“Five state supreme
courtsthe supreme courts of Vermont, Massachusetts, Indiana, Illinois, and
Ohioapplied the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantee’s equality language that ‘all men
are by nature equally free and independent’ to hold that slavery was
unconstitutional.”).
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This judicial activism was a necessary evil to escape the confines of
antiquated laws that failed to keep pace with modern thinking and the
changing morals of society.116
Out of this body of law came the notion of the penumbra doctrine.
The literal meaning of penumbra is “a space of partial illumination (as
in an eclipse) between the perfect shadow on all sides and the full
light.”117 In constitutional jurisprudence, it has come to be known as
the rights guaranteed by implication in the Constitution.118 The
penumbra doctrine historically has been utilized by the United States
Supreme Court to recognize fundamental or natural rights not
explicitly stated in the Federal Constitution or other federal laws.119
It has been used most notably in matters of privacy related to sex
between two or more consenting parties who are both old enough and
sober enough to consent.120 The consensus in this body of law is that
sexual intercourse between two legally consenting individuals is
private and should be free from invasive government interference.121
Given current sexting trends, it is time that this doctrine be applied to
legally consenting teens.
If Minnesota designated sixteen as the age of legal consent to sex,
then teens who are sixteen or older should be free to enjoy all the
accoutrements of the sexual act—including sexting—without fear of
criminal prosecution. By highlighting the holding and legal analysis of
cases like Griswold v. Connecticut122 (in which the United States
Supreme Court held that a criminal prohibition against the use of
contraceptive devices by married couples to prevent pregnancy
violated the constitutionally protected right of privacy) and Lawrence
116. See generally id.
117. Penumbra, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1996).
118. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 479 (1965) (holding that specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras that recognize certain fundamental
rights not articulated verbatim in the Constitution’s text. One of these penumbra
rights is the right to marital privacy. A Connecticut law forbidding the use of
contraceptives unconstitutionally infringed upon that right).
119. Id.
120. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 YALE L. SCH. FAC. SCHOLARSHIP
SERIES 737-44 (1989), https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?art
icle=2568&context=fss_papers [https://perma.cc/59FB-MRBT].
121. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
122. 381 U.S. at 479.
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v. Texas123 (which struck down sodomy laws in fourteen states,
including Texas), the defense bar and others concerned about this
injustice can tackle this last bastion of sexual discrimination.
In the Griswold decision, Justice William O. Douglas used the
penumbra doctrine to recognize the privacy rights of married couples.
Griswold was centered on the unconstitutionality of a Connecticut law
that prohibited Estelle Griswold, the executive director of Planned
Parenthood League of Connecticut, and Dr. C. Lee Buxton, a medical
professor at Yale Medical School and director of the League’s New
Haven office, from prescribing contraceptive devices and giving
contraceptive advice to married persons.124 Buxton and Griswold
launched an appeal challenging the law which made it unlawful to use
any drug or medicinal article for the purpose of preventing
conception, asserting that the appeal was on behalf of all married
persons with whom they had a professional relationship.125 The Court
ruled that the law was unconstitutional because it violated married
persons’ right to privacy.126 In the opinion, Justice Douglas stated that
“guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance,” and the right to privacy exists within these areas.127
Using Griswold and its progeny could help invalidate the child
pornography law as applied to teens sixteen and older and their right
to privacy in exercising their legal right to have sex. Just like a married
couple or a non-marital couple engaging in a private sexual act, older
teens should be afforded the same access to flirting or sexual arousal
through sexting without fear of severe and life-changing criminal
consequences.128
Moreover, given that delinquency charges for many serious
offenses committed by children ages sixteen and older are public
123. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
124. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 485–86.
127. Id. at 484–85.
128. MINN. STAT. § 617.247, subdiv. 4(a) (2013) (“A person who possesses a
pornographic work . . . is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for
not more than five years and a fine of not more than $5,000 for a first offense and for
not more than ten years and a fine of not more than $10,000 for a second or
subsequent offense.”).
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information, youth prosecuted under this statute face the immediate
public stigma associated with any sex crime involving children.129 The
embarrassment of public condemnation for the charge might affect
the individual’s ability to attend college, seek employment, and find
safe and affordable housing in the future.130
In addition to the criminal sanctions and public stigma of the
charge, a convicted youth also faces registration as a predatory
offender.131 The registration period lasts “until ten years have elapsed
since the person initially registered in connection with the offense, or
until the probation, supervised release, or conditional release period
expires, whichever occurs later.”132 Failing to register, as young
people are prone to do given their lack of maturity and typical address
instability, exposes individuals to additional charges.133 Moreover, the
registration requirement undermines the rehabilitative focus and
protective nature of juvenile court embodied in the parens patriae
doctrine.
B. Older Teens Should Be Afforded Shelter Under the Equal
Protection Doctrine
The Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Minnesota
Constitutions “guarantee that every person shall be free from
arbitrary and intentional discrimination” brought about by a
statute.134 Under Minnesota law, a legislative classification will
129. MINN. STAT. § 260B.163(1)(c)(2) (2018).
130. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Juvenile Justice: Adolescent
Development and the Regulation of Youth Crime, 18 THE FUTURE OF CHILD., PRINCETON-
BROOKINGS 15, 27 (2008) https://futureofchildren.princeton.edu/sites/futureofchild
ren/files/media/juvenile_justice_18_02_fulljournal.pdf [https://perma.cc/CDV3-
HPN5].
131. MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (2016).
132. Id. subdiv. 6(a).
133. See id. subdiv. 5.
134. State v. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901, 906 (Minn. 1983); see also U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV (“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); MINN. CONST. art. I, §
2 (“No member of this state shall be disfranchised or deprived of any of the rights or
privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land or the judgment
of his peers.”).
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survive an equal protection challenge if: (1) “[t]he distinctions which
separate those included within the classification from those excluded
. . . are genuine and substantial,” (2) “the classification [is] . . . genuine
or relevant to the purpose of the law,” and (3) “the purpose [is] one . .
. the state can legitimately attempt to achieve.”135
Review of an equal protection challenge under the less stringent
federal rational basis test requires: (1) a legitimate purpose for the
challenged legislation, and (2) that it was “reasonable for the
lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would
promote that purpose.”136
Some may argue that the issue of sexting between teen peers
sixteen or older is still controversial despite the legalization of sex
within this age group because society does not wish to condone what
might lead to unintended consequences, such as nonconsensual
dissemination of sexually explicit videos to nefarious third parties.137
Any sexual act within this age group, however, could lead to
undesirable results, such as unwanted pregnancy or the transmission
of sexually transmitted diseases. Moreover, harassment statutes
could be used to discourage cyberbullying behaviors without labeling
the offending party as a sexual predator. As it stands right now, even
two consenting teens in this age group could be prosecuted for sexting
each other within the confines of a non-predatory, loving, and
committed relationship.138 Thus, for no legitimate reason, teens face
135. Guilliams v. Comm’r of Revenue, 299 N.W.2d 138, 142 (Minn. 1980) (quoting
Miller Brewing Co. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 353, 356 (Minn. 1979)); see also State v.
Holloway, 916 N.W.2d 338, 348–50 (Minn. 2018) (determining that limiting age
classifications in a statutory rape defense did not violate the Equal Protection Clause);
State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 889 (Minn. 1991) (determining that a statute that
distinguished crack and powder cocaine violated the Equal Protection Clause).
136. See, e.g., W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 668
(1981).
137. See Raychelle Cassada Lohmann, The Dangers of Teen Sexting, PSYCHOL. TODAY
(July 20, 2012), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/teen-
angst/201207/the-dangers-teen-sexting [https://perma.cc/QN7Q-DKW7]; Steven
Woda, 7 Consequences of Teen Sexting, UKNOWKIDS DIGITAL PARENTING BLOG (June 26,
2012), http://resources.uknowkids.com/blog/bid/177105/7-consequences-of-
teen-sexting [https://perma.cc/XKB8-N963].
138. See MINN. STAT. §§ 617.246, subdiv. 5; 617.247, subdiv. 6 (2018) (establishing
that consent is not an affirmative defense to the creation or possession of nude photos
of a minor).
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harsh legal consequences that similarly situated adults do not—a
clear violation of the Equal Protection Clauses of both the Federal and
Minnesota Constitutions.
C. Section 617.247, subdivision 4(a) is Unconstitutionally Vague
When Interpreted to Include Sexually Explicit Videos Between
Adolescents
In launching a legal challenge that is generally applicable to all
adolescents who engage in sexting, the Due Process Clauses of both
the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution are
fertile ground as they generally prohibit vague statutes.139 A statute
“may be impermissibly vague because it fails to establish standards
for the police and public that are sufficient to guard against the
arbitrary deprivation of liberty interests.”140 A criminal statute must
“provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to
understand what conduct it prohibits.”141 “Where a statute imposes
criminal penalties, a higher standard of certainty of meaning is
required.”142 Due process requires that “[p]ersons of common
intelligence must not be left to guess at the meaning of a statute nor
differ as to its application.”143 “The constitutional requirement of
definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person
of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is
forbidden by the statute.”144
1. Minnesota Courts Should Assess a Child’s Knowledge Through
the Standard of a Reasonable Juvenile.
The Minnesota courts should apply a “reasonable juvenile”
standard in assessing whether the youth knew or should have known
the content and character of the sexting material at issue was in fact
child pornography. In doing so, however, it is imperative to give
139. State v. Christie, 506 N.W.2d 293, 301 (Minn. 1993) (citing State v.
Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Minn. 1985)).
140. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 (1999) (citing Kolender v. Lawson,
461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983)).
141. Id. at 56 (citing Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357).
142. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d at 528 (citation omitted).
143. Id. (quoting Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1925)).
144. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).
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historical context to the word “pornography” and examine how
changing social mores have drawn a distinction between
constitutionally protected sexual expression and legally condemned
obscenity.
The word “pornography” comes from the Greek word
“pornographos,” which distilled down to its roots is a combination of
the Greek words “porne” meaning prostitute and “graphein” meaning
to write.145 So in its purest sense, the word pornography means
“writing about prostitutes” or individuals engaged in sex or sexual
gratification for hire, which arguable suggests an inherent element of
both commercial profit and exploitation due to a disparity of
power.146 Over time, this definition has evolved to include all
depictions of sexual behavior that are erotic or lewd and designed to
stimulate sexual excitement in its audience, but the legal analysis
always harkens back to the issue of exploitation of the subject to
derive ill-gotten gains.
It is not surprising then, that First Amendment legal analysis on
this issue addresses these seminal issues of sexual mores and power.
When analyzing any form of pornography in the legal context,
however, one must contemplate the application of the First
Amendment. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees freedom of expression, including sexual expression, in all
citizenry, including children.147 But the issue of pornography as a
form of sexual expression protected under the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution and obscenity that is not protected by
the First Amendment has been the subject of constitutional debate for
decades. Cases such as Roth v. United States, which held that obscenity
is “utterly without redeeming social importance” and therefore is not
protected by the First Amendment, established a test for discerning
whether sexually explicit material was obscenity or constitutionally
protected expression.148
145. WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY (1984).
146. Id.
147. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
148. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). The Roth test for obscenity was “whether to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest.” Id. at 489.
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The Roth test was generally viewed as too nebulous to be
helpful.149 Thus in 1966, the United States Supreme Court adopted a
new standard.150 In John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure v.
Attorney General, the Supreme Court concluded that to meet the legal
definition of obscenity, the material must, aside from appealing to the
prurient interests of its audience, be “utterly without redeeming
social value” and “patently offensive because it affronts contemporary
community standards relating to the description of sexual
matters.”151 However, even this standard was considered too vague
to give clear directives for determining whether sexually explicit
material was obscene or constitutionally protected speech.152
The Supreme Court gave more clarity to the legal analysis of
obscene materials in Miller v. California.153 A distinction was drawn in
Miller between hard-core pornography which was not protected
under the First Amendment and soft-core pornography which was
protected speech.154 Hard-core pornography was deemed patently
offensive, and included, but was not limited to representations of
“ultimate sex acts” and “masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd
exhibition of the genitals.”155 In contrast, soft-core pornography
involved depictions of nudity and limited or simulated sexual
conduct.156
However, in 1982, the Supreme Court took a zero tolerance
approach to child pornography in New York v. Ferber.157 Ferber held
that child pornography of any kind is not a form of expression
protected under the Federal Constitution—First Amendment or
otherwise. It found that the state of New York had a compelling
149. See generally A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure” v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 418.
152. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
153. See id. In Miller, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger opined that pornographic
material was legally obscene if the work, taken as a whole and viewed through the
lens of contemporary community standards: (1) appeals to the prurient interest; (2)
depicts sexual conduct in a patently offensive way; and (3) lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value. Id. at 24–26.
154. See id. at 27–29.
155. Id. at 25–26.
156. Id. at 25.
157. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
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interest in protecting children from sexual abuse and found a close
connection between such abuse and the use of children in the
production of pornographic materials.158
In 1990, the Court went even further in upholding a state law
prohibiting the possession and viewing of child pornography in
Osborne v. Ohio.159 Arguably, this constitutional jurisprudence was a
reflection of a feminist movement, that started in the 1960s and
culminated in the 1980s, that launched an unprecedented attack on
the pornography industry which disproportionately victimized and
exploited female youth for profit.160
However, neither the Ferber Court, nor the Osborne Court
contemplated the widespread use of such statutes to prosecute
adolescents
engaged in the consensual dissemination and possession of
sexually explicit material with peers of the same age, not for profit but
for their own personal sexual expression. Moreover, neither Court
contemplated the widespread use of cell phones, texting, nor social
media to express sexual thoughts and imagery and pass along
sexually-explicit materials received from others among a technology-
obsessed generation of youth and young adults. Given these dramatic
cultural changes, this area of the law is ripe for judicial review to
adjust these laws to modern times.
In fact, there is persuasive legal precedent that suggests that the
United States Supreme Court, if not local appellate courts, would be
responsive to a First Amendment legal challenge to the practice of
prosecuting sexting youth under felony child pornography
statutes.161
158. Id. at 756.
159. 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
160. See Hanna Roos, Trading the Sexual Child: Child Pornography and the
Commodification of Children in Society, 23 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 131 (2014).
161. See, e.g., Hudnut v. American Booksellers Association, Inc., 771 F.2d 323 (7th
Cir. 1985) (reviewing a First Amendment challenge to an Indianapolis ordinance
prohibiting pornography that was passed due to the efforts of feminist like
MacKinnon and Dworkin and political conservatives who championed their cause).
However, although the Seventh Circuit ostensibly agreed with prevailing feminist
thought that pornography affected how people view the world and their social
relations, it noted that the same logic applied to other forms of offensive, but
nonetheless protected speech, like racial bigotry. See id. at 330.
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With the advent of the Internet in the 1990s, the First
Amendment debate entered a new battleground.162 Legal scholars
debated how the electronic distribution of pornography should be
regulated by the government.163 The use of computer bulletin boards
and the Internet to distribute pornography world-wide led to the
enactment of the Federal Communications Decency Act (“CDA”). This
act prohibited the distribution of obscene and indecent sexual
material in cyberspace to minors.164 In Reno v. American Civil Liberties
Union, relying on well-established First Amendment precedent, the
Supreme Court overturned provisions of the CDA prohibiting
transmission of obscene or indecent material by means of electronic
devices.165 The Court held that the provisions represented a content-
based restriction, in violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment.166
The above analysis of the relevant case law in this field illustrates
two things: that the debate on the legality of sexually explicit material,
be it traditional forms of pornography or sexting, is inextricably
linked to a discussion of changing social mores and what does or does
not offend the general conscience of our society and cultural
institutions. It is also inextricably linked to a discussion about
whether the subject of that sexual material is the victim of predatory
exploitation caused by a patently unfair disparity of power. This
article posits that sexting between two adolescent peers in its purest
sense is sexual exploration and not predatory behavior. Thus, such
162. See Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1115 (2005).
163. See id.; Mark Tushnet, Internet Exceptionalism: An Overview from General
Constitutional Law, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1637 (2015).
164. See id.
165. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
166. The Supreme Court reasoned as follows: “[w]e are persuaded that the CDA
lacks the precision that the First Amendment requires when a statute regulates the
content of speech. In order to deny minors access to potentially harmful speech, the
CDA effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional
right to receive and to address to one another. That burden on adult speech is
unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving
the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve.
In evaluating the free speech rights of adults, we have made it perfectly clear that
“[s]exual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the
First Amendment.” Reno, 521 U.S. at 874–75. (internal citations omitted).
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behavior is reasonably protected speech under the First Amendment,
not chargeable obscenity. Moreover, if there is a predatory aspect in
any given factual scenario, the resulting prosecution should be
narrowly tailored to that predatory behavior through pre-existing
harassment and cyberbullying statutes, rather than automatically
characterizing such behavior as sexual violence worthy of felony
prosecution and registration as a sexual predator.
The factor that distinguishes children who sext from adults who
disseminate and/or possess child pornography is intent. To be
convicted of possession of pornographic work involving minors, the
defendant must have knowledge, or reason to know, of the work’s
“content and character.”167 “Reason to know” means that “the
possessor is subjectively aware of a ‘substantial and unjustifiable risk’
that the work involves a sexual exploitation of a minor--not sexual
exploration with a peer of the same age.”168
Typically, when assessing mens rea, the court applies a
“reasonable person” standard.169 However, in some circumstances,
Minnesota courts have elected to apply a reasonable juvenile
standard.170 For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court has applied
this standard in assessing the culpable negligence of a minor in
juvenile delinquency proceedings,171 stating:
[I]t is anomalous to premise an adjudication of a child’s
delinquency on failure to conform his conduct to adult
standards. Accordingly, in juvenile delinquency
proceedings, the question of culpable negligence must be
decided with reference to the conduct and appreciation of
risk reasonably to be expected from an ordinary and
reasonably prudent juvenile of a similar age.172
167. MINN. STAT. § 617.247, subdiv. 4(a) (2018).
168. State v. Mauer, 741 N.W.2d 107, 115 (Minn. 2007).
169. See id. at 116 (“It is possible that the district court determined Mauer had
reason to know because . . . a reasonable person under the circumstances should have
known.”).
170. See In re Welfare of S.W.T., 277 N.W.2d 507, 514 (Minn. 1979) (“[T]he
evidence indicated that both of them acted together with conscious disregard of a risk
which reasonable children of their ages would have appreciated.”).
171. See id.( In the instant case, the referee found that the standard of culpable
negligence applicable to delinquency proceedings was one “commensurate with the
age, intelligence and experience of the respondents.”).
172. Id. (emphasis added).
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As of yet, the reasonable juvenile standard has not been applied
to the element of knowledge; however, Minnesota courts have not
foreclosed such a possibility. In the two cases where the court of
appeals has addressed the issue of applying the reasonable juvenile
standard to the knowledge element, the court rejected the argument
because the issue was not raised in the lower court and the petitioner
did not cite any case law.173
In In re A.A.M., the Minnesota Court of Appeals did not apply the
reasonable juvenile standard to the issue of consent.174 This does not
preclude courts from applying this standard to the element of
knowledge, however. Consent is defined by Minnesota law as “words
or overt actions by a person indicating a freely given present
agreement to perform a particular sexual act with the actor.”175 The
determination on whether consent was present focuses on the actions
of the victim and whether the victim agreed, through words or overt
actions, to perform a sexual act.176 Because the analysis focuses on the
victim’s actions, it is logical the court would not apply a reasonable
juvenile standard to the defendant when assessing the actions of the
victim.
“Knowledge,” on the other hand, focuses on the subjective
mental state of the defendant.177 Under Minnesota law, to “know” a
fact “requires only that the actor believes that the specified fact
exists.”178 It is widely accepted that Minnesota courts apply this
standard in determining whether a juvenile placed in custody
173. In re Welfare of J.E.M., No. A11-1614, 2012 WL 1380400, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App.
Apr. 23, 2012) (“Because appellant failed to raise the “reasonable juvenile standard”
argument in district court, it is waived.”); In re Welfare of J.T.R., No. A08-1586, 2009
WL 1920372, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. July 7, 2009) (“Appellant cites no support
indicating that Minnesota courts have approved the use of a “reasonable juvenile”
standard in cases involving mentally impaired persons or in criminal-sexual-conduct
cases.”).
174. 684 N.W.2d 925, 928 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (“[T]here exists no caselaw or
statutory authority in Minnesota to support appellant's proposition that a reasonable
juvenile standard should apply to the element of consent in a criminal-sexual-conduct
case, and we reject such an assertion.”).
175. MINN. STAT. § 609.341, subdiv. 4 (2016).
176. Id.
177. MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 9(1) (2018).
178. Id. at § 609.02, subdiv. 9(2) (2018) (emphasis added).
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believed that they were free to go.179 There is no legal distinction
made between the “believe” in custody determinations and the
“believe” when assessing a defendant’s knowledge. Therefore, the
Minnesota courts should apply the reasonable juvenile standard to
assess a juvenile’s belief as they have done in assessing the belief of
juveniles in other situations.
2. A Reasonable Juvenile Would Not Believe the Character of the
Video in Question to be Child Pornography.
When viewing sexting through the lens of a reasonable juvenile,”
it is clear the content and character of the video would not have been
recognized as child pornography.180 Juveniles often see each other
naked, whether it be in a locker room or when exploring their
sexuality with one another. Juveniles do not see each other as being
part of some protected class—the way the law and adults do—but
rather as peers or equals. Under Minnesota law, it would have been
legal for juveniles of the same age to see each other naked in
person.181 Further, it would have been legal for these youths, age
sixteen or older, to engage in sexual intercourse with either one of the
people in the video.182 A reasonable juvenile would not, therefore,
have made the abstract connection that it would be legal to perform
the acts in the video with the people in the video, but the actual video
itself would be considered illegal child pornography.
D. Accepting the Realities of Adolescent Sexuality Through
179. In re Welfare of G.S.P., 610 N.W.2d 651, 657 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (“The test
is not whether a reasonable person under the circumstances would believe they were
not free to leave, but whether a reasonable person under the circumstances
would believe they were in police custody of the degree associated with formal
arrest.”)
180. See In re Welfare of J.E.M., No. A11-1614, 2012 WL 1380400, at *8 (Minn. Ct.
App. Apr. 23, 2012); In re Welfare of J.T.R., No. A08-1586, 2009 WL 1920372, at *2
(Minn. Ct. App. July 7, 2009).
181. See generally MINN. STAT. § 617.247 (2018) (listing prohibited acts but not
listing juveniles seeing each other naked).
182. See generally MINN. STAT. § 609.342, subdiv. 1 (2018) (listing prohibited acts
for certain age disparities).
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Prohibition of Strict Liability Child Pornography Laws
The sexual expression of children is an inherently controversial
topic. Although it is generally treated as a social norm that babies and
children under the age of ten should not engage in sex, once a child
reaches adolescence—transitioning to adulthood through sexual
development—reasonable minds disagree as to what is or is not
acceptable sexual behavior between peers. 183 Many believe that sex
among teens is per se wrong.184 Such opponents focus on teens’
immaturity, vulnerability, and the risks of pregnancy, sexually
transmitted diseases, or emotional and physical injury.185 “However,
a competing discourse of sex positivity acknowledges the sexual
dimension of development, and recognizes that mutually agreed upon
adolescent sexual encounters can in certain contexts be a normal and
healthy aspect of the transition to adulthood, and are not per se
morally problematic, undesirable or unsafe.”186
Even if we were to adopt the “discourse of sex positivity,” which
acknowledges that some adolescent sex is developmentally
appropriate, there are other gray areas to consider. For example,
“there is not always a clear dividing line between sexual activity and
sexual abuse, acceptable persuasion and impermissible coercion,
consent and non-consent, or childhood incapacity and coming-of-age
competence.”187 Additionally, the teenage angst that might trigger
regret or emotional confusion, even if the act is wholly consensual and
does not result in unwanted pregnancy or sexually transmitted
disease, must also be considered.188 Because of these difficulties,
183. High, supra note 8, at 794.
184. Id. at 792 (citing General Social Survey 2006, THE ASS’N OF RELIGION DATA
ARCHIVES, http://www.thearda.com/Archive/Files/Descriptions/GSS2006.asp
[https://perma.cc/DV9G-AQ2M] (noting 71.4 percent of survey participants
responded that premarital heterosexual sex among fourteen- to sixteen-year-olds is
“always wrong,” compared to 25.6 percent responding to adult premarital sex as
“always wrong”)).
185. Id. at 791.
186. Id. at 792 (citations omitted).
187. Id. at 793 (citing Rigel Oliveri, Note, Statutory Rape Law and Enforcement in
the Wake of Welfare Reform, 52 STAN. L. REV. 463, 485 (2000)).
188. See id. at 800–02.
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there is an inevitable “analytical complexity when it comes to
regulating juvenile sexual behavior.”189
Historically, our state legislature has responded to this
complexity with bright-line, strict liability laws on topics of sex.190 For
example, despite the danger of selective prosecution, certain laws
regulating sexual activity remain on the books and are enforceable,
even in the face of changing sexual mores.191 Laws such as adultery,
sodomy, and fornication, for example, are still valid.192 Laws
governing statutory rape, criminal sexual conduct, and child
pornography, although ostensibly serving legitimate state interests,
still fail to acknowledge—let alone carve out exceptions for—
consenting, sexually mature adolescents engaging in sexual behavior
in non-predatory contexts.193
The age of consent laws are perhaps the only laws in which the
state legislature directly addresses the reality that teens do engage in
sexual intercourse and honors the general belief of a society that sees
no good in criminalizing the sexual acts of this segment of the
adolescent population, in particular those aged sixteen and older.194
However, even the age of consent laws are problematic in that they
create a legal fiction of a fixed age at which a child develops
competency to consent.195
The age of consent thereby functions as a bright-line
proxy for the boundary between wrongful sex, involving a
presumptively incompetent and exploited juvenile, and
good or at least morally permissible sex. This approach
involves a legal fiction, because the childhood-adulthood
transition is a continuum, not a switch, and all adolescents
traverse the transition, from vulnerability and immaturity
to autonomy and competence, at different speeds, meaning
“any one teen . . . might not fit into the model.”
A more nuanced approach is to recognize that the
competence of juveniles to meaningfully and responsibly
consent to sex and resist sexual manipulation and coercion
189. Id. at 793.
190. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 609.293, 609.34, 609.342, 609.36 (2018).
191. Id.
192. MINN. STAT. §§ 609.293, 609.34, 609.36.
193. MINN. STAT. § 617.247 (2018).
194. MINN. STAT. §§ 609.342–345 (2018).
195. High, supra note 8, at 794.
39
Bailey and Heinrich: Stop in the Name of Love: Putting an End to the Felony Prosecutio
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access,
808 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:3
is dependent not only on the juvenile's age, but also on
contextual factors such as the relative ages of the sexual
partners and the nature of the sexual activity in question.196
Applying this logic to child pornography statutes could eliminate
the bright-line age of consent rule altogether, eliminate strict liability
for possession and dissemination of sexual images of minors, and
examine whether the facts suggest force, coercion, or lack of legal
consent. This approach leaves room for the “I’ll-show-you-mine-if-
you-show-me-yours” playful scenarios that are not predatory and are
part of normal adolescent sexual development, while also
safeguarding against age-disparity-based power imbalances that may
impact young people negatively as they navigate their burgeoning
sexual curiosity.197 The advantage of this approach is that it avoids
socially undesirable prosecutions under strict liability prohibitions
and narrowly tailors the prohibitions to exploitative sexual relations
where age disparity, coercion, or other predatory tactics are used by
one adolescent to take advantage of another.
This more narrowly tailored and fact-specific approach would
not reflect societal approval of sexting among adolescents but, rather,
would prioritize the prosecution of coercive sexual relations as the
primary punitive target of child pornography laws. Such reform is also
“congruent with evidence more generally of growing societal
acceptance of the reality of adolescent sexuality. For example, most
states have decriminalized or ceased prosecuting fornication, and
there is increasingly strong support for school-based sex education
that goes beyond the ‘abstinence only’ message.”198 However, as it
stands now, local prosecuting authorities have taken a machete to do
the job of a scalpel with its broad child pornography prosecutions of
minors—inadvertently destroying one child in an effort to protect
another.
196. Id.
197. Cf. Roe, supra note 55; Cynthia Godsoe, Recasting Vagueness: The Case of Teen
Sex Statutes, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 173, 230–31 (2017); Chemaly, supra note 84;
Trisha Tulloch & Miriam Kaufman, Adolescent Sexuality, 34 PEDIATRICS IN REVIEW (Jan.
2013), http://pedsinreview.aappublications.org/content/34/1/29
[https://perma.cc/VU9K-XD9L] (discussing normal teenage sexual development,
curiosity, and expression).
198. High, supra note 8, at 796.
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E. Statutory Interpretation Canons Should Narrow the Child
Pornography Statue’s Application to Clearly Predatory Cases
1. The Court Must Interpret an Intent to Possess Element Into
Section 617.247 of the Minnesota Statutes.
In State v. McCauley, the court declined to read an “intent to
possess” element into the possession of child pornography statute.199
This decision was premised on the rejection of the defendant’s claim
that the statute dictated strict liability because the statute requires
knowledge of the content and character of the pornography.200 In the
court’s decision, they never addressed the intent of the statute, as
related to possession, or the absurd outcome that arises from not
requiring an element of intent to possess.
The governing principle of statutory interpretation is to apply the
plain meaning of the statute’s language.201 “Plain meaning
presupposes the ordinary usage of words that are not technically used
or statutorily defined . . . .”202 Plain meaning includes interpreting the
language of the statute in context of the whole act.203 “Courts should
construe a statute to avoid absurd or unjust consequences.”204 In the
present case, the court must interpret section 617.247 as having an
element of “intent to possess child pornography” in order to avoid an
absurd result, fulfill the intent of the legislature, avoid a potential
constitutional issue, and advance the policy of protecting our society
against over-criminalization.205
2. Prosecutions Under Section 617.247 Will Lead to an Absurd
Result Without an Intent to Possess Element
Failing to read an intent element into the child pornography
statute will lead to an absurd result. The statute at issue was originally
written in 1982—before commercially available cell phones, texting,
199. 820 N.W.2d 577, 585 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012).
200. Id. at 586.
201. Occhino v. Grover, 640 N.W.2d 357, 360 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
202. Id. at 359.
203. Id.
204. Hince v. O’Keefe, 632 N.W.2d 577, 582 (Minn. 2001).
205. See MINN. STAT. 617.247 (2018); Occhino, 640 N.W.2d at 360.
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or the widespread use of personal computers and the internet.206 At
that time, a person had to actively seek child pornography in order to
obtain it.207 This is no longer the case. With the widespread use of cell
phones, sext messaging has become increasingly popular among high-
school-aged “teens and young adults.”208 A national study showed
that twenty-two percent of teenage girls and eighteen percent of
teenage boys had posted or sent nude or semi-nude pictures of
themselves.209 Anyone who receives a “sext” message from a minor is
in violation of section 617.247 the moment they look at the message.
If a teen accidentally sends a “sext” message to a wrong number, the
unfortunate owner of that wrong number, therefore, will be in
violation of the law once they read, open, or view the message.210
Without any knowledge, consent, or involvement, people may
inadvertently become felons and registered sex offenders by way of
another person’s actions—a clearly unjust and absurd result.
4. Section 617.247’s Classification as a Predatory Offense Shows
that the Legislature Intended an “Intent to Possess” Element
Applying the plain meaning principle to both the individual
words of the statute and their meaning within the context of the
criminal code, it is clear the legislature intended the statute to require
an intent to possess the child pornography. The Minnesota legislature
has categorized possession of child pornography as a “predatory
offense” under section 243.166.211 Therefore, anyone convicted of
206. MINN. STAT. § 617.247 (1982); see also Peter Ha, All-TIME 100 Gadgets:
Motorola DynaTAC 8000x, TIME (Oct. 25, 2010), http://content.time.com/time/speci
als/packages/article/0,28804,2023689_2023708_2023656,00.html
[https://perma.cc/G4NX-WNWP]; World Wide Web Timeline, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 11,
2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/03/11/world-wide-web-timeline/
[https://perma.cc/AES4-GXYA].
207. See Rebecca Cafe, Police Detections of Child Porn Images Increases by 48%,
BBC NEWS (Feb. 23, 2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-21507006 [https://per
ma.cc/APP2-K3P6] (referring to child pornography before 1990 as existing in “just
7000 hard copy images”).
208 See Sex and Tech, supra note 31.
209 . Id.
210. MINN. STAT. § 617.247 (2018) (to be guilty of possession, a person must
merely possess a prohibited image “knowing or with reason to know its content and
character.”).
211. MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (2018).
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possession of child pornography is a considered a predatory
offender.212 Webster’s Dictionary defines “predatory” as “inclined or
intended to injure or exploit others for personal gain or profit.”213
There is a clear element of intent within the plain meaning of
predatory. Further, to “offend” is to transgress or violate the law.214
The words “transgress” and “violate” both suggest an action by the
person.215 Therefore, the plain meaning of “predatory offender” is
someone that intends to exploit or injure another through violating
the law.
The other statutes categorized as predatory offenses show that
the legislature intended to include an intent to commit the crime in
the statute.216 Other crimes categorized as predatory offense crimes
involve perpetrators that exploited, took advantage of, or injured
another sexually through an affirmative act.217 These statutes were
clearly not meant to cover a situation where the defendant performed
no affirmative act and made no attempt no attempt to exploit, take
advantage of, or injure another.
4. The Statute is Overly Broad Without an “Intent to Possess”
212. Id.
213. Predatory, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/predatory [https://perma.cc/V8GK-LY49] (emphasis
added).
214. Offend, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/offend [https://perma.cc/UV6U-8RHL].
215. See Transgress, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/transgress [https://perma.cc/2KUE-EPVP]; Violate,
MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionar
y/violate [https://perma.cc/6CVG-JDHY].
216. MINN. STAT. § 243.166, subdiv. 1b. (referencing MINN. STAT. §§ 609.185(a)(2),
609.25, 609.342, 609.343, 609.344, 609.345, 609.3451, subdiv. 3, 609.3453, 617.23,
subdiv. 3, 609.2325, subdiv. 1(b), 609.255, subdiv. 2, 609.322, 609.324, subdiv. 1(a),
609.352, subdiv. 2(a)(1), 617.246, 617.247, 609.3455, subdiv. 3a (2018)).
217. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 609.185(a)(2), 609.25, 609.342, 609.343, 609.344,
609.345, 609.3451, subdiv. 3, 609.3453, 617.23, subdiv. 3, 609.2325, subdiv. 1(b),
609.255, subdiv. 2, 609.322, 609.324, subdiv. 1(a), 609.352, subdiv. 2(a)(1), 617.246,
617.247, 609.3455, subdiv. 3(a) (2018).
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Element and Potentially Violates the First Amendment
Minnesota courts should interpret statutes so as to avoid
constitutional problems.218 The First Amendment protects a person’s
right to free speech.219 A fundamental element in the right to free
speech is the right to receive information.220 A statute risks violating
the First Amendment if it has a chilling effect on protected free
speech.221
To avoid a potential chilling effect on the freedom of speech,
Minnesota courts must interpret the current child pornography
statute as containing an element of intent to possess the child
pornography.222 Without an element of intent to possess the
prohibited pornography, the statute would run the risk of being
overly broad.223 Anytime a person receives a text message, there is a
possibility it could contain a sexually explicit image of a minor. A
person does not know what the message contains until they read it. If
the message contains child pornography, the person is in violation of
the law the moment they open the message. This broad application
could create a chilling effect on the message receiver’s First
Amendment right to receive information. To prevent this chilling
effect, the court must interpret the statute more narrowly to require
that the defendant have an intent to possess the pornography.
In recent years, over-criminalization has been acknowledged as
a serious problem within our criminal justice system—so much so
that the House Federal Judiciary Committee authorized a bi-partisan
taskforce to investigate the over-criminalization of federal laws.224 It
218. Hince v. O’Keefe, 632 N.W.2d 577, 582 (Minn. 2001).
219. See U. S. CONST. amend. I.
220. Dekart v. Milczark, No. C4-98-733, 1998 WL 644255, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App.
Sept. 22, 1998) (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564–65 (1969)).
221. See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (explaining that laws
having a deterrent effect on free speech, although not actually prohibiting it, are
equally unconstitutional as they place an undue burden on speakers who wish to
speak but refrain from doing so out of fear of prosecution).
222. See MINN. STAT. § 617.247 (2013).
223. See id.
224. See Press Release, H.R. Judiciary Comm., House Judiciary Comm.
Reauthorizes Bipartisan Over-Criminalization Taskforce (Feb. 22, 2016),
http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/2014/2/house-judiciary-committee-
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is hard to imagine a better example of over-criminalization than a
statute allowing a person whose only act was to open a message they
never requested or wanted to see to be convicted of a crime. In the
interest of reducing over-criminalization in our society, courts should
interpret this statute narrowly to prevent teens from being convicted
of a felony. Therefore, Minnesota courts must interpret an “intent to
possess” element into the statute to advance the policy issue of
preventing over-criminalization.
4. Section 617.247’s Prohibtions Should Not Include Sexually
Explicit Material Exchanged Between Adolescent Peers.
Subdivision 1, section 617.247, of the Minnesota Statutes
highlights the policy and purpose of this child pornography statute
stating:
It is the policy of the legislature in enacting this section
to protect minors from the physical and psychological
damage caused by their being used in pornographic work
depicting sexual conduct which involves minors. It is
therefore the intent of the legislature to penalize possession
of pornographic work depicting sexual conduct which
involve minors or appears to involve minors in order to
protect the identity of minors who are victimized by
involvement in the pornographic work, and to protect
minors from future involvement in pornographic work
depicting sexual conduct.225
Minnesota courts should ascribe these words their “most natural
and obvious usage unless it would be inconsistent with the manifest
intent of the legislature.”226 Moreover, in 2013 the Minnesota
Supreme Court made it clear that “[u]nder the associated-words
canon, when context suggests that a group of words have something
reauthorizes-bipartisan-over-criminalization-task-force [https://perma.cc/E59E-
C437].
225. MINN. STAT. § 617.247, subdiv. 1 (2018).
226. Amaral v. Saint Cloud Hosp., 598 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn. 1999) (citing MINN.
STAT. § 645.08(1) (1998); Homart Dev. Co. v. Cty. of Hennepin, 538 N.W.2d 907, 911
(Minn. 1995)).
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in common, each word should be ascribed a meaning that is consistent
with its accompanying words.”227
The State’s attempt to expand the understanding of the statute to
include an unprecedented theory of prosecution ignores that an
ordinary person must understand what conduct would be
prohibited.228 No ordinary person would have noticed that sexually
explicit videos shared between adolescent peers is illegal. Thus, the
statute is vague and Minnesota courts must interpret it narrowly.229
A related doctrine and canon of interpretation, the rule of lenity,
also requires the narrow reading of the statute. The rule of lenity
“ensures fair warning [to citizens] by so resolving ambiguity in a
criminal statute as to apply it only to conduct clearly covered.”230 “The
rule of lenity ‘vindicates the fundamental principle that no citizen
should be held accountable for a violation of a statute whose
commands are uncertain, or subjected to punishment that is not
clearly prescribed.’”231
Furthermore, Minnesota courts must interpret the statute
narrowly to avoid the constitutional problems the State’s theory
creates.232 As defense counsel argued in the original brief, under the
227. State v. Rick, 835 N.W.2d 478, 485 (Minn. 2013) (citing Gustafson v. Alloyd
Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995)); see also Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S.
26, 36 (1990) (“The traditional canon of construction, noscitur a sociis, dictates that
‘words grouped in a list should be given related meanings.’”) (citations omitted); State
v. Taylor, 594 N.W.2d 533, 536 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (“Pursuant to the doctrine of
noscitur a sociis, a word should be construed with reference to the words around it.”)
(citation omitted).
228. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (“[A]lthough clarity at
the requisite level may be supplied by judicial gloss on an otherwise uncertain statute
. . . due process bars courts from applying a novel construction of a criminal statute to
conduct that neither the statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to
be within its scope . . . .”) (internal citations omitted).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Rick, 835 N.W.2d at 486 (citing United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514
(2008)); see also State v. Colvin, 645 N.W.2d 449, 452 (Minn. 2002) (“If construction
of a statute is uncertain, a statute may not be interpreted to create criminal offenses
that the legislature did not contemplate.”) (citation omitted).
232. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (“[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of
a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the
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State’s interpretation of the statute, there is no logical distinction
between one who passively receives an uninvited sexually explicit
video of a minor engaged in a sexual act on their phone and another
who actively seeks it out on the black market, well aware of its
contents, in order to satisfy a prurient or sexually deviant interest in
children.233
Further, a sexually explicit video created by minors and
distributed to minors is not child pornography per se. The State’s
failure to make this distinction when interpreting the statute also
violates a person’s fundamental right to privacy regarding intimate
and consensual sexual relationships. Therefore, the statute should be
subject to strict scrutiny under the Constitution.
In Carey v. Population Services Int’l, the United States Supreme
Court recognized procreation as a basic liberty under the Fourteenth
Amendment.234 The Court further noted that its history of decisions
under the Fourteenth Amendment recognize a fundamental right to
privacy surrounding a person’s most intimate activities and
relationships.235 In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court held a statute
criminalizing sodomy violates constitutional due process by
interfering with a person’s autonomous choice of sexual partner.236 As
such, the Minnesota courts must not only interpret the statute
narrowly because the State’s prosecutorial theory renders it vague,
but also because a broad reading violates fundamental constitutional
rights. Moreover, the statute is not intended to be used to prosecute
minors who inherently would not know or have reason to know that
the pornographic work involves other minors, such as classmates,
peers, or former girlfriends.
5. Subdivision 1(a) of Section 624.713 is not a Strict Liability
statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the
intent of [the legislature].”).
233. Brief for Appellant at 22, State v. McCauley, 820 N.W.2d 577 (2012) (No.
A11-0606), 2012 WL 4838693, at *22.
234. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1977); see also Skinner
v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541–42 (1942).
235. Carey, 431 U.S. at 684–85.
236. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565, 574 (2003).
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Offense.
State prosecutors have historically asserted that section 624.713,
subdivision 1(a) of the Minnesota Statutes is a strict liability
offense.237 Specifically, the State has asserted that the only defenses
applicable to charges under this statute are those expressly
enumerated in the statutory language and the defense of necessity.238
However, such an argument is inherently illogical, deleted text and
finds no support in governing case and statutory law.
In Staples v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a statute
similar to section 624.713 did not create a strict liability offense.239 In
Staples, the petitioner was charged with possessing an unregistered
machine gun in violation of the National Firearms Act.240 Under that
act a machine gun is defined as a weapon that automatically fires more
than one shot with a single pull of the trigger.241 During his testimony
at trial, Staples testified that the machine gun had never discharged
automatically while he owned it, nor did he have knowledge of its
capacity to do so.242 Staples was later convicted, in part, because the
district court refused to instruct the jury that the government must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Staples knew the gun could fire
fully automatically in order to establish a violation of section
5861(d).243 The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the
government need not prove a defendant’s knowledge of a weapon’s
physical properties to obtain a conviction.244 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to address the mens rea requirement of section
5861(d).245
In its argument to the Court, the government asserted that
section 5861(b) was a strict liability offense because mens rea was not
a required element of the offense.246 The government further argued
that Congress intended the National Firearms Act to regulate and
237. MINN. STAT. § 624.713, subdiv. (1)(a) (2000).
238. State v. Rein, 477 N.W.2d 716, 718 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
239. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 618–19 (1994).
240. Id. at 600; 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d).
241. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b).
242. Staples, 511 U.S. at 600.
243. Id. at 603; see also United States v. Staples, 971 F.2d 608, 616–17 (1992).
244. Staples, 971 F.2d at 612.
245. Staples, 511 U.S. at 604.
246. Id. at 605–06.
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restrict the circulation of dangerous weapons.247 Because of this, the
government asserted that the Staples case fit into a line of precedent
concerning what courts deem to be “public welfare” or “regulatory”
offenses.248 In this line of cases, courts have inferred congressional
intent to impose strict criminal liability in statutes meant to regulate
potentially harmful or dangerous items.249 Here, the government
explained that section 5861(d) defines precisely the sort of regulatory
offense described in these “public welfare” cases.250 The Supreme
Court disagreed.251
The Court reasoned that under the government’s argument, all
guns would be considered dangerous devices, even if they were not
statutory “firearms” that give gun owners notice to determine, at their
own risk, whether their weapons come within the range of the Act.252
On this understanding, “a conviction can rest simply on proof that a
defendant knew he possessed a ‘firearm’ in the ordinary sense of the
term.”253 The Court failed to see the logic in this interpretation.254 It
noted that “the existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the
exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal
jurisprudence.”255 Further, the Court recognized “that the common-
law rule requiring mens rea has been ‘followed in regard to statutory
crimes even where the statutory definition did not in terms include
it.’”256 Relying on this traditional rule, the Court found that “offenses
that require no mens rea generally are disfavored” and suggested that
“some indication of congressional intent, express or implied, is
required to dispense with mens rea as an element of a crime.”257 With
respect to section 5861(d), the Court concluded that the
247. Id. at 606.
248. Id. at 600–01.
249. See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943) (stating, in
dicta, that a statute criminalizing the shipment of adulterated or misbranded drugs
did not require knowledge that the items were misbranded or adulterated).
250. Staples, 511 U.S. at 600.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 608.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 609.
255. Id. at 605 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,
436–37 (1978)).
256. Id. at 605–06 (quoting United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251–52 (1922)).
257. Id. at 606.
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Government’s interpretation of the statute would penalize ostensibly
innocuous conduct, which is an absurd result that the legislature did
not intend.258
The level of punishment attached to violations of section 5861(d)
also was relevant to the Court’s determination. The Court noted that
“[h]istorically, the penalty imposed under a statute has been a
significant consideration in determining whether the statute should
be construed as dispensing with mens rea.”259
Six years after the Staples decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court
applied its logic to a state statute in In re Welfare of C.R.M.260 In C.R.M.,
a juvenile faced a charge of felony possession of a dangerous weapon
on school property, and the court faced the issue of whether the State
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew he
possessed a knife on school property.261 In that case, a teacher found
a folding knife with a four-inch-long blade in C.R.M.’s coat pocket
during a standard contraband check of students’ coats.262 At trial the
258. Id. at 614–16. Specifically, the Court reasoned: Here, there can be little doubt
that . . . the Government’s construction of the statute potentially would impose
criminal sanctions on a class of persons whose mental state—ignorance of the
characteristics of weapons in their possession—makes their actions entirely
innocent. The Government does not dispute the contention that virtually any
semiautomatic weapon may be converted, either by internal modification or, in some
cases, simply by wear and tear, into a machinegun within the meaning of the Act. . . .
But in the Government’s view, any person who has purchased what he believes to be
a semiautomatic rifle or handgun, or who simply has inherited a gun from a relative
and left it untouched in an attic or basement, can be subject to imprisonment, despite
absolute ignorance of the gun’s firing capabilities, if the gun turns out to be an
automatic. Id. at 614–15. (internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court concurred
with the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that: It is unthinkable to us that Congress intended
to subject such law-abiding, well-intentioned citizens to a possible ten-year term of
imprisonment if . . . what they genuinely and reasonably believed was a conventional
semi-automatic weapon turns out to have worn down into or been secretly modified
to be a fully automatic weapon. Id. at 615 (quoting United States v. Anderson, 885 F.
2d 1248, 1254 (5th Cir. 1989)).
259. Id. at 618–19 (“[W]here, as here, dispensing with mens rea would require
the defendant to have knowledge only of traditionally lawful conduct, a severe
penalty is a further factor tending to suggest that Congress did not intend to eliminate
the mens rea requirement. In such a case, the usual presumption that a defendant
must know the facts that make his conduct illegal should apply.”).
260. 611 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 2000).
261. Id.
262. Id. at 803.
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juvenile testified that although a knife was in his coat, he did not know
it was there, and, therefore, he should not be held liable for
possession.263 At the close of the State’s case, C.R.M. moved for a
directed verdict, arguing that any reasonable interpretation of the
possession element of the statute would require him to know that the
knife was in his coat pocket and that general intent required
knowledge of possession.264 The prosecutor argued “that the statute
does not require either knowledge or intent because it creates a strict
liability crime,” and the State must only demonstrate that the
appellant possessed a dangerous weapon on school grounds.265 The
district court adopted the prosecutor’s strict liability interpretation of
the statute and found C.R.M. guilty.266 The Court of Appeals
affirmed.267
On review, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed C.R.M.’s
conviction and used policy reasoning to highlight the importance of
the protection of public welfare.268 Certain items, by their very nature,
suggest that possession is not innocent because possession itself is
demonstrative of intent. An example of such an item would be
unlicensed hand grenades.269 On the other hand, courts are reluctant
to interpret statutes to eliminate mens rea where doing so would
criminalize a broad range of what would otherwise be innocent
conduct.270 The Staples court recognized that lawful gun ownership
fell into the latter category and pointed “to the tradition of gun
ownership and the fact that guns have not historically been
considered of such a dangerous nature that their owners should be on
notice that mere possession is a crime.”271 In applying similar
reasoning to the case at hand, the Minnesota Supreme Court observed
that “knives as common household utensils are clearly not inherently
dangerous, as they can be used for a myriad of completely benign




267. In re C.R.M., No. C6-98-2385, 1999 WL 595371, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 10,
1999).
268. In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d at 809.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 809–10.
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purposes,” and are not as “inherently anti-social as illegal drugs and
hand grenades.”272 The Court concluded this public welfare analysis
by reaffirming that “mere possession of something that may fit the
statutory definition of ‘dangerous weapon’ would not create a level of
panic that a “reasonable person should know [possession] is subject
to stringent public regulation.”273 The Minnesota Supreme Court
ultimately held that proof of a felony offense for violating a
prohibition on the possession of a dangerous weapon on school
property requires that the State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the accused knew he possessed a knife while on school
property. The case was reversed and remanded to the trial court to
determine whether the appellant had knowledge of possession of the
knife while on school property.274
Applying Staples to the present case, it follows that the statute on
child pornography is not considered a strict liability offense. Under
section 609.035, subdivision 1 of the Minnesota Statutes, if a person’s
conduct constitutes more than one offense under the laws of this
state, the person may be punished for only one of the offenses and a
conviction or acquittal of any such offense is a bar to prosecution for
any other of them.275 The purpose of section 609.035 is twofold: to
protect criminal defendants from serialized prosecution and to afford
them protection against multiple punishment.276 Under section
609.04, subdivision 2, a conviction or acquittal of a crime is a bar to
further prosecution of any included offense or other degree of the
same crime.277 Section 609.04, subdivision 1 defines an included
offense as any of the following:
(1) A lesser degree of the same crime; or
(2) an attempt to commit the crime charged; or
(3) an attempt to commit a lesser degree of the same crime;
or
(4) a crime necessarily proved if the crime charged were
proved; or
272. Id. at 810.
273. Id. (quoting Liparota v. United States, 417 U.S. 419, 433 (1985)).
274. Id.
275. MINN. STAT. § 609.035, subdiv. 1 (2000).
276. State v. Johnson, 141 N.W.2d 517, 520 (Minn. 1966).
277. MINN. STAT. § 609.04, subdiv. 2 (2000).
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(5) a petty misdemeanor necessarily proved if the
misdemeanor charge were
proved.278
The prohibitions listed in sections 609.035 and 609.04 apply only
if the potential offenses arise out of a single behavioral incident.279 In
State v.Bookwalter, the Minnesota Supreme Court expressed that the
facts and circumstances are determinative of whether multiple
offenses arose out of a single behavioral incident and articulated the
standard for making this legal determination.280 Two factors to be
considered are, the “singleness of purpose of the defendant and the
unity of time and place of the behavior.281 State v. Frank relied on the
same legal standard by holding that the defendant’s desire to “obtain
a single criminal objective” constituted a single offense.282 The State
then has the burden of proving that the “offenses were not part of a
single behavioral incident” for multiple sentences.283
When the standard articulated in Frank and Bookwalter is read in
conjunction with the prohibitions of sections 609.035 and 609.04, it
becomes clear that if a defendant is acquitted of one offense and
convicted of a lesser included offense, 609.035 would bar prosecution
for the lesser included offense.284 In other words, 609.035 and 609.04
bar legally inconsistent verdicts arising out of the same behavioral
incident. Verdicts are legally inconsistent if a single necessary element
of a greater and included offense are subject to conflicting findings by
the jury.285
When determining whether a reasonable jury or fact finder could
adjudicate a youth for illegally possessing a sexting image, intent must
be examined closely and assessed on a case-by-case basis.286 Applying
278. Id. at subdiv. 1.
279. 541 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Minn. 1995).
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. N.W.2d 744, 750 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
283. Id. (quoting State v. Gilbertson, 323 N.W.2d 810, 812 (Minn.1982)).
284. See MINN. STAT. § 609.035(1) (2018).
285. State v. Netland, 535 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Minn. 1995); see, e.g., State v. Moore,
458 N.W.2d 90, 93–95 (Minn. 1990) (holding that the guilty verdict of premeditated,
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sections 609.035, 609.04, and governing case law to the child
pornography statute as applied to juveniles, it is a legal contradiction
for a jury to say that a sexually mature youth should be held criminally
liable for possession of an image he inadvertently received without
solicitation. Any other result would lead to a legal absurdity. Under
section 645.17(1) of the Minnesota Statutes, courts must presume
that “the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible
of execution, or unreasonable.” Accordingly, courts should dismiss
charges where criminal intent is absent.
IV. CONCLUSION
Experimentation with sexting and sexual intercourse is a normal
part of adolescent sexual development. As society adjusts to the
notion of adolescent sexual autonomy and privacy interests, the legal
community must keep pace by balancing the interest in safeguarding
youth from predatory offenders and acknowledging that not all
sexting or adolescent sexual expression warrants criminal
prosecution.
The best solution is to change governing laws to reflect this shift
in adolescent behavior and to draft statutes that are narrowly tailored
to the problems these scenarios present without irreparably harming
the adolescent offender with felony brands that will hinder their pro-
social advancement. One obvious fix would be a misdemeanor statute
and diversion programming for first time offenders.
Many [state] statutes specify sexting as a misdemeanor,
create educational or diversion programs, or institute civil
fines as punishment. Some statutes involved eliminating
mandatory minimum sentencing for persons less than 18
years of age and authorize orders relieving a person of the
obligation to report as a sex offender. Legislation proposed
in Indiana sought to treat those under age 22 more leniently
if the images are maintained only on a cellular telephone or
social media website as opposed to postings on other
locations on the internet. . . .
Georgia made it a misdemeanor for someone at least 14
year old to send a sexually explicit photograph to someone
18 years old or younger, if the purpose of distributing it was
not for harassing, intimidating, or embarrassing the minor
depicted, or for any commercial purpose. With this statute,
Georgia reduced the charges and punishment for minors
54
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involved in sexting. Before this change, minors could be
convicted of felony sexual exploitation of children. This
conviction would come with a sentence of 5 to 20 years’
imprisonment and fines up to $100,000.287
But while we wait for these broad policy solutions from our
legislators, the legal community must still do its part. It is incumbent
upon prosecutors to think through the collateral consequences of
their charging decisions, so as not to inadvertently do more harm than
good in addressing situations more suited to less-damaging,
rehabilitative charging alternatives. Though some defense attorneys
feel it casts too wide a net, Minnesota’s relatively new “revenge porn”
law is a good start.288 Specifically, Entitled Nonconsensual
Dissemination of Private Sexual Images, section 617.261 of the
Minnesota Statutes, makes it illegal to “intentionally disseminate an
image of another person who is depicted in a sexual act or whose
intimate parts are exposed” when: (1) the person is identifiable; (2)
the person charged knows or reasonably should know that the person
depicted does not consent to the dissemination; and (3) the image was
obtained or created under circumstances in which the person charged
knew or reasonably should have known the person depicted had a
reasonable expectation of privacy.289
The revenge law can result in felony or gross misdemeanor
charges, depending upon the circumstances of the case.290 It is a
felony charge if one of the following factors is present: (1) the person
depicted suffers financial loss due to the dissemination; (2) the person
charged disseminates the image with intent to derive a profit; (3) the
person charged maintains a web site, online service, online
application, or mobile application for the purpose of disseminating
287. Lorang et al., supra note 33, at 75.
288. Nonconsensual Dissemination of Private Sexual Images – Revenge Porn Law,
N. STAR CRIMINAL DEF. BLOG (June 15, 2018), https://www.northstarcriminaldefense.c
om/nonconsensual-dissemination-private-sexual-images-revenge-porn-law
[https://perma.cc/2FK3-K2V6] (noting the “revenge porn” law “is written in an
overbroad manner to capture much more conduct that perhaps was intended.”).
289. Id.; see also, MINN. STAT. § 617.261 (2018) (explaining that a “person is
identifiable: (i) from the image itself, by the person depicted in the image or by
another person; or (ii) from personal information displayed in connection with the
image.”).
290. Nonconsensual Dissemination of Private Sexual Images – Revenge Porn Law,
supra note 288.
55
Bailey and Heinrich: Stop in the Name of Love: Putting an End to the Felony Prosecutio
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access,
824 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:3
the image; (4) the person charged posts the image on a web site; (5)
the person charged disseminates the image with intent to harass the
person depicted; (6) the person charged obtains the image by
violating laws of theft, computer theft, unauthorized computer access,
or interference of privacy; or (7) the person charged has a prior
conviction under this chapter.291 Where the accused is a young adult
or teenager, prosecutors should exercise their discretion cautiously
by pursuing the lesser charge whenever possible, agreeing to
continuances without a plea or stays of adjudication, or tagging the
case for diversion from the court system altogether.
Aside from prosecutorial discretion, judges should exercise their
discretion to protect minors and young adults where prosecutors and
defense attorneys fall short. Giving such offenders the opportunity to
keep their records clean after rehabilitative programming is
complete, or dismissing such cases altogether when the facts suggest
the alleged offender lacked predatory intent, are both well within
acceptable limits of judicial discretion.
Strict liability prohibitions against sexting to and from minors
fails to acknowledge the complexity of the issue.292 At a minimum,
states should not prosecute adolescents for sexting when they are old
enough to legally engage in sexual intercourse and there are no other
elements of harassment, bullying, violence, or coercion. It is also
important not to condemn minors for sending sexually explicit selfies
as it is illogical to prosecute an individual as simultaneously the victim
and perpetrator of the offense.293 For the remainder of adolescents
who are below the age of consent, a case-by-case approach makes
more sense. A prerequisite to prosecution should be facts that reflect
egregious sexual predatory behavior, rather than age-appropriate
sexual exploration and adolescent mischief.294 For less egregious
cases, harassment and cyberbullying statutes should be used to avoid
the collateral consequences that accompany felony convictions. In
291. MINN. STAT. § 617.261, subdiv. 2(b) (2018).
292. Ibtesam, supra note 99, at 255–56 (discussing how most current sexting
statutes do not address sexting between teenagers, and thus, teenagers who
participate in sexting are at risk of being prosecuted under child pornography laws).
293. Id. at 246.
294. Id. (“Fundamentally, teenage sexting is a product of sexual curiosity, poor
judgment, and a modern trend in which teenagers utilize electronic file sharing as
their primary method of communication.”).
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short, the prosecution and response of the courts should be
commensurate with the unique facts of the case and allow youths to
commit acts of indiscretion without being inappropriately labelled as
sexual abusers of other children.
Because sexting is such a common teenage behavior and within
the range of normal adolescent sexual development,295 these findings
are a call to action to all adults who interact with children. Not only
should we do our best to educate adolescents about the potential
dangers of sexting, we should also advocate politically for “softer legal
punishments so stretched resources can be used to fund educational
programs for teens on reducing [high-]risk sexual behavior.”296
Launching nation-wide campaigns297 targeting adolescents aged
twelve to seventeen to highlight the dangers of sexting—including
public humiliation, online exploitation, cyberbullying, and criminal
sanctions—is also necessary to address this issue. We, as a society,
must reject the notion that current practices are acceptable and do
everything possible to stem the tide of future prosecutions and
victimizations of our youth for what arguably is age-appropriate, even
if misguided behavior.
295. Elizabeth Englander, Stop Demonizing Teen Sexting. In Most Cases, It’s
Completely Harmless, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/posteverything/wp/2014/11/07/stop-demonizing-teen-sexting-in-most-cases-its-
completely-harmless/?utm_term=.8e02be2c9867 [https://perma.cc/GQ6D-ZJK6].




297. Madigan & Temple, supra note 19 (discussing a campaign launched called
“sexts are porn” which was “targeted at students aged 12 to 17” and warned of
dangers of sexting).
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